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NOT BAD FOR GOVERNMENT WORK: DOES
ANYONE ELSE THINK THE SUPREME COURT
IS DOING A HALFWAY DECENT JOB IN ITS
ERIE-HANNA JURISPRUDENCE?

Thomas D. Rowe, Jr.*

I.

INTRODUCTION

A tough crowd, those academic commentators. Especially, it
seems, when the subject is a teaching favorite on which the professoriat can be expected to have strong views, such as the Supreme
Court's decisions in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins' and its progeny.
Throughout the six decades since the Court in Erie overruled Swift v.
Tyson,2 putting the federal courts out of the business of making general federal common law for matters that would have been decided
under state common law if they were in the state courts, much of the
Elvin R. Latty Professor of Law, Duke University. BA. Yale, 1964; M. Phil.
Oxford, 1967; J.D. Harvard, 1970. For suggestions on earlier drafts, my thanks to
Professors Kevin Clermont and Jay Tidmarsh and to J. Benjamin King; remaining
errors are of course mine. I am indebted to participants in a lively and extended email discussion of Gasperiniv. Center for Humanities, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2211 (1996), the
case that provides the point of departure for this Essay, via the medium of a listserv
for civil procedure professors maintained by Professor Ann Althouse of the University
of Wisconsin Law School. Because discussants often make comments casually I will
not quote or attribute them, but special acknowledgments are due to Professors
Roger Baron, Kevin Clermont, Stan Cox, Richard Freer, Edward Hartnett, Allen
Kamp, Roger Kirst, Larry Kramer, Christopher Mueller, Tyler Ochoa, Wendy Collins
Perdue, David Shapiro, Lawrence Solum, and Allan Stein. Except for Professor
Clermont they have not reviewed this essay, with which many of them will no doubt
disagree-as they frequently did with each other! For research leave that has aided
my work on this essay, I am grateful to the E.T. Bost Fund of the Duke University
School of Law, and for hospitality and collegiality during the leave to the RAND
Corporation's Institute for Civil Justice.
1 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
*

NOTRE DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL- 73:4

law review commentary on the Court's Erie decisions has been critical 3-and

4
sometimes deservedly so.

The first reactions to the Supreme Court's latest in the line of Erie
and its progeny, the 1996 decision of Gasperiniv. Centerfor Humanities,
Inc., 5 continue this pattern. Indeed, the criticisms come from such
divergent and sometimes opposing standpoints that they might leave
Justice (and onetime Professor) Ruth Bader Ginsburg, author of the
Gasperini majority opinion, wondering if her former colleagues and
students in the academy are determined to cut the Court no slack in
this area no matter what it does. Solomonically, Gasperinicalls for application of a state statutory review standard for excessiveness or inadequacy of jury awards rather than a federal decisional standard
involving less intensive scrutiny, but follows practice under federal law
in allocating responsibility for trial court application and appellate review of determinations under the state standard. That is too "statefriendly" for an anonymous student commentator in the HarvardLaw
Review's annual Supreme Court issue, 6 who laments the Court's supposed abandonment of what the comment takes to have been the pre3 For an early example, see ArthurJ. Keeffe et al., Weary Erie, 34 CoRELL L.Q.
494, 494 (1949) ("We think that the broad policy formulated by the Supreme Court
in reversing Swift v. Tyson was based upon a misconception of the problems involved
in diversity litigation."). Even in the modem literature one can find a call for abandonment of Erieand a return to Swift (a debate I will not get into in this article, Erie
being the fixture that it is). SeeJohn B. Corr, Thoughts on the Vitality of Erie, 41 AM. U.
L. REv. 1087, 1089 (1992) ("Erie, as currently applied, is not mandated constitutionally and.., the costs of continued adherence to the doctrine are difficult tojustify on
policy grounds. The recommendation that follows is simple to state, though difficult
to swallow: Swift should be viewed as a preferred alternative."); see also, e.g., Richard D.
Freer, Erie's Mid-Life Crisis, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1087 (1989) (criticizing the Supreme
Court's decisions as interpreting positive federal law too broadly, thus overriding legitimate state concerns, and for providing unclear, manipulable standards for cases
involving decisional federal law). Not all the commentary has been highly critical.
See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 (1964).
4 See, e.g., Edward Lawrence Merrigan, Erie toYork to Ragan-A Triple Play on the
Federal Rules, 3 VAND. L. REv. 711, 711-12 (1950) (criticizing the Supreme Court's
decisions in Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949); Woods
v. InterstateRealty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949); and Cohen v. Beneficial IndusrialLoan Corp.,
337 U.S. 541 (1949), "[plractising attorneys are unable to determine which of the
Federal Rules will remain in full effect, and which might be rejected by the courts on
the theory that they conflict in a substantial way with some state law").
5 116 S. Ct. 2211 (1996).
6 See The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Leading Cases, 110 HAV. L. REV. 135, 263-66
(1996) (hereinafter The Supreme Court, 1995 Term). A student comment in the Arkansas Law Review echoes the assumptions and criticisms in the Harvard writeup. See Eva
Madison, Case Note, The Supreme Court Sets New Standardsof Review for Excessive Verdicts
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viously governing balancing approach of Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural
7

Electric Cooperative.

By contrast, Professor Douglas Floyd takes the Court to task for
having "relied centrally on Byrd,"8 and in its treatment of Gasperini
having created great uncertainty over the weight to be given federal
and state interests9-with the danger of "unwarranted subordination
of substantive state objectives to ad hoc judicial perceptions of amorphous federal procedural 'interests." '" 0 From still another angle, a
student note in the Cornell Law Review argues that "Gasperini affirms
the Byrd balancing test's continuing vitality in the Erie analysis and
clarifies the federal interests that have relevance in that balance[,]"
but "undermines the holding of Hanna [v. Plumer"] by allowing state
2
law to define the substance of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure."'
And a student piece in the PaceLaw Review 1 3 largely endorses the position taken injustice Scalia's Gasperinidissent, 14 arguing that the majority gave too little force both to the Seventh Amendment's reexamination clause and to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) on
new trials. Gasperiniis beginning to seem like a palimpsest, into which
one can inscribe almost any meaning (good or bad) of one's
choosing.
in Federal Court in Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 50 ARK. L. REv. 591,
616-17, 626 (1997) (citing and quoting The Supreme Court, 1995 Term, supra).
7 356 U.S. 525 (1958); see The Supreme Court, 1995 Term, supra note 6, at 257
(describing Byrd approach of "balanc[ing] state and federal interests" as having been
"the dominant precedent" for cases involving "the conflict between a state statute and
a judge-made federal practice," with Gasperinisignaling a "surprising change in Eie
jurisprudence" leaving the method for resolving such conflicts "unclear") (footnote
omitted); id. at 266 (criticizing Court for having "abandoned a useful analytical framework" by "refusing to follow Byrd," thereby "squander[ing] an opportunity to provide
much-needed stability to a family of Erie conflicts that was, and remains, obscure").
8 C. Douglas Floyd, Erie Awry: A Comment on Gasperini v. Center for Humanities,
Inc., 1997 BYU L. Rrv. 267, 270.
9 See id. at 297 ("Gasperini provided the Court with a much needed opportunity
to explore the foundations of Eie, to reconcile its disparate approaches in Hanna [v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965),] and Byrd, and to explain, confine, or reject Byrd's balancing approach in light of the uncertainties and criticism that it has spawned."); id.
at 305 ("Rather than clarify and resolve, however, the Court's opinion confuses and
confounds. Byrd still lives, but we know not why, or to what extent.").
10 Id. at 270.
11 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
12 J. Benjamin King, Note, Clarification and Disruption: The Effect of Gasperini v.
Center for Humanities, Inc. on the Erie Doctrine, 83 CouNELL L. REv. 161, 183 (1997).
13 Joseph B. Koczko, Note and Comment, Gasperini v. Center for Humanities,
Inc.: State Jury Award Controls Supplant Seventh Amendment Protections, 18 PACE L.REv.
199 (1997).
14 Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2230-40 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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The Gasperini majority opinion is not a shining model, but
neither does it strike me as a severe muddle. And it does not appear
to mark a major shift in the Supreme Court's Eriejurisprudence of the
last third of a century. More broadly, however few of my colleagues in
the legal academy may hold this view, it seems to me that since the
Court decided Hanna in 1965 it has provided and maintained a reasonably stable, workable, and sensible structure for analyzing issues in
what I like to call-because of Hanna's importance-the Erie-Hanna
area of state-federal law choice for federal courts. Lest I be taken as
giving the Court more praise than it may deserve, I offer about one
and a half cheers; significant problems do dog the Court's approaches
and its applications of them, and it could do better. But it could doand in some areas such as the fragmented, highly indefinite doctrine
governing personal jurisdiction, has done 1 5 -far worse.
Because of the disagreement among commentators about where
Erie-Hannadoctrine stood before Gasperini, Part II of this essay summarizes what the Supreme Court's case law appeared to say before
Gasperini on the core matters of determining whether a state-federal
law conflict existed and if so which law should prevail. (I put aside
such significant further problems in this general area as choice between laws of different states when some state law will govern, and
determining the content of applicable state law, neither of which Gasperini seems to affect.) Part III examines Gasperini with an emphasis
on what it seems to leave unchanged, what may differ since that decision, and what remains unclear. Part IV concludes with some observations on the general state of Eie-Hanna lore-and on the relative
merits of the performance of the Supreme Court and its academic
critics in this field.

15 See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (upholding by unanimous judgment "transient" personal jurisdiction over nonresident individual served
in state during temporary presence unrelated to matter in suit, but without any opinion or portion commanding votes of more than fourJustices); Asahi Metal Indus. Co.
v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (striking down by unanimous judgment Cali-

fornia personal jurisdiction over Japanese tire valve maker impleaded as third-party
defendant by Taiwanese tube manufacturer to which valve maker had shipped component for incorporation into final product, with unanimous opinion only as to facts
of case, and eightJustices agreeing on part of opinion holding exercise ofjurisdiction
unreasonable in light of evaluation of multiple factors in addition to third-party de-

fendant's contacts with forum, but no majority opinion resolving recurring "streamof-commerce" issue).
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The Erie-Hannacommentary does not need another run-through
of the major cases; that job has been ably done various times, most
recently by Professor Allan Ides' survey of the area.' 6 But the perplexing level of disagreement and apparent confusion over just what the
Supreme Court has been saying about how to come at Erie-Hanna
problems makes it worthwhile to explore whether the pre-Gasperini
status of approaches in this area had been characterized more by clarity and stability or by obscurity and unsettledness. At the level of overall approach, Erie-Hannadoctrine seems to me-despite much of what
has been said in the literature-to have been increasingly definite and
stable (as well as sensible and usually administrable). The cases worth
the Supreme Court's attention, not surprisingly, have been some of
the hardest and those most lending themselves to disagreement over
application of the Court's approaches. An understandable concentration on such trees or clumps may have made it too hard to keep the
forest in focus; hence, I attempt a guided tour of the forest.
A.

The Conflict-DeterminationStage

Since the Erie-Hanna area involves state-federal law choice, in
practical application a first issue will often be whether any choice
need be made. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly put it in cases
involving acts of Congress and Federal Rules of Civil and Appellate
Procedure, the "first question must ... be whether the scope of the

[possibly applicable provision of federal law] in fact is sufficiently
broad to control the issue before the Court.' 1 7 This much seems en16 Allan Ides, The Supreme Court and the Law To Be Applied in Diversity Cases: A Critical Guide to the Development and Application of the Erie Doctrine and Related Problems, 163
F.R.D. 19, 21-74 (1995).
17 Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1980) (interpreting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 not to speak to tolling for purposes of state statute of
limitations applicable in diversity case in federal court involving potential clash between state statute requiring service of process within limited period after running of
statute of limitations and Federal Rule 3 on filing of complaint effectuating commencement of action, thus leaving state requirement as governing law); see Stewart
Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 26 (1988) ("[W]hen the federal law sought to be
applied is a congressional statute, the first and chief question . . .is whether the
statute is 'sufficiently broad to control the issue before the Court.'" (quoting Walker,

446 U.S. at 749-50)); Burlington N. R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1987) ("The
initial step is to determine whether, when fairly construed, the scope of Federal Rule
[of Appellate Procedure] 38 is 'sufficiently broad' to cause a 'direct collision' with the
state law or, implicitly, to 'control the issue' before the court .... " (quoting Waler,
446 U.S. at 749-50 & n.9, and Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472)).
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tirely unexceptionable and also applicable to cases in which the potentially governing federal rule of law is constitutional on the one
hand or purely decisional on the other, 18 with the room for disagreement arising chiefly over the interpretation of the federal rule. 19
A key subsidiary point at this conflict-determination stage is the
approach to construction of the Federal Rule, on which the attitude at
least until Gaperiniappeared to involve not going out of the way to
avoid finding a conflict. While finding no conflict in Walker v. Armco
Steel Corp.2 0 and emphasizing that the Hannaconflict-resolution analysis applies "only if [the] question [whether the scope of the Federal
Rule is sufficiently broad to control] is answered affirmatively," 2' the
Court also stated: "This is not to suggest that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure are to be narrowly construed in order to avoid a 'direct
collision' with state law. The Federal Rules are to be given their plain
meaning.. .. ,"22 Indeed, the Court in all its other major Erie-Hanna
decisions since 1965 involving federal statutes and rules had found the
23
"direct collision" that triggers the Hanna analysis.
Despite the frequency of conflict findings in the few cases that
have reached the Supreme Court, the types of circumstances that can
18 See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 52 (1991) (in a case involving
judge-made federal rule, stating that "only when there is a conflict between state and
federal substantive [sic] law are the concerns of Erie... at issue").
19 See, e.g., Stewart Org., 487 U.S. at 34-38 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority's interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1994) on transfer of venue "[flor the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice," as governing whether to
give effect to forum-selection clause in contract between parties, when law applicable
in courts of state where suit was filed disfavored such clauses).
20 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
21 Id. at 749-50.
22 Id. at 750 n.9.
23 See Stewart Org., 487 U.S. at 30 (finding direct conflict even though 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a) (1994) on venue transfer "and Alabama's putative policy regarding forumselection clauses are not perfectly coextensive"); Burlington N. R.R. v. Woods, 480
U.S. 1, 7 (1987) (finding that Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38's "discretionary
mode of operation unmistakably conflicts with the mandatory provision of Alabama's
affirmance penalty statute [ALA.. CODE § 12-22-72 (1986) (amended 1987)]"); Hanna
v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 463 n.1 (1965) (stating that although both federal and state
service provisions aimed "to insure that executors will receive actual notice of
claims... the Federal Rule reflects a determination that this goal can be achieved by
a method less cumbersome than that prescribed" by state law); id. at 470 (federal rule
"says-implicitly, but with unmistakable clarity-that in-hand service is not required
in federal courts"); cf Business Guides, Inc., v. Chromatic Communications Enters.,
498 U.S. 533, 540-54 (1991) (reading Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 to apply to
signature of represented party as well as that of counsel, despite dissent urging narrower interpretation partly because of concern for possible incursion into domains of
state law, see id. at 554-70 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
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bring about an absence of conflict are several. Most fundamentally,
after Erie's negation of federal courts' power to create general common law, 24 at least in the absence of action by Congress pursuant to
one of its enumerated powers there may be no federal law that can
apply.2 5 Second, as Walker illustrates by its construction of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 326 not to address tolling for purposes of an
applicable state statute of limitations, even federal and state rules that
are very much in the same area may not speak to the same precise
point, so that each may be given its different but non-conflicting effect. Third, state and federal provisions frequently track each other
or, even if phrased differently, have the same effect, often because
state rules are modeled on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or
sometimes because the Federal Rule was inspired by state law.27 In

such cases a federal court need not reach choice issues and can follow
the law as supplied by both systems. And fourth, sometimes federal
procedure borrows at least part of its content from state law, which
28
eliminates the possibility of conflict.

B.

The Conflict-Resolution Stage

Since Hanna, and Professor John Hart Ely's illuminating and deservedly influential article nine years later,29 it has seemed clear that
after a finding of a state-federal law conflict, the starting point is to
identify the source or nature of the possibly applicable federal rule of
law (to which I shall sometimes refer, for brevity, as the "candidate"
federal rule). To embellish Ely's analysis slightly, for purposes of this
area federal law comes in four types-the United States Constitution,
24
25

See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 ("There is no federal general common law.").
Cf Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471-72:
[N] either Congress nor the federal courts can, under the guise of formulating rules of decision for federal courts, fashion rules which are not supported by a grant of federal authority contained in Article I or some other
section of the Constitution; in such areas state law must govern because
there can be no other law.
26 FED. R. Civ. P. 3 ("A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the
court.").
27 See FED. R. Civ. P. 68 advisory committee's note (citing statutes from Minnesota, Montana, and New York in connection with original promulgation of Rule 68 on
offers ofjudgment).
28 See e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k) (1) (A):
(1) Service of a summons or filing a waiver of service is effective to establish
jurisdiction over the person of a defendant
(A) who could be subjected to the jurisdiction of a court of general
jurisdiction in the state in which the district court is located ....
29 John Hart Ely, The IrrepressibleMyth of Erie, 87 HILv.L. REv. 693 (1974).

NOTRE

DAME LAW REVIEW

[VCOL- 73:4

acts of Congress, Federal Rules of procedure promulgated by the
Supreme Court pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act 3° (including, for
these three types, judicial constructions of the Constitution, federal
statutes, and Federal Rules), or purely decisional federal law. 31 The
type of the candidate federal rule in turn determines the approach to
the validity of the federal rule, which if valid and contrary to state law
governs under the Supremacy Clause.32 The first three of these areas-Constitution, statute, and Federal Rule under REA authorityseem little affected by Gasperini,but a sketch can be useful to provide
the overall framework.
1. Constitutional Rules
The Constitution provides some procedural rules applicable to
civil cases in federal but not state courts, such as those derived from
the Fifth Amendment's Due Process clause 33 and the Seventh Amendment'sjury trial guarantee.3 4 Whenever such a provision applies, ErieHannaapproach issues are trivial because of the Constitution's universal-trump character; if the Seventh Amendment mandates a trial by
jury in a particular type of case or on some issue in a case, it makes no
difference even in a state-law case whether a state court would choose
judge or jury trial.3 5 In such cases, too, despite the general validity of
30

28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994):
(a) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of
practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States
district courts (including cases before magistrates thereof) and courts of
appeals.

(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.
I follow Ely's practice of using initial capitals in referring to Federal Rules promulagated under the Enabling Act and lower-case letters in referring to federal rules of law
of other types. See Ely, supra note 29, at 697 n.31.
31 Given the context and Erie's elimination of general, substantive federal common law, the federal rules in question here are those of a procedural or partiy procedural nature.
32 U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
33 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law ... ").
34 U.S. CONSr. amend. VII:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a
jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than
according to the rules of the common law.
35 Cf Marshall v. Perez Arzuaga, 828 F.2d 845, 849 (1st Cir. 1987) cert. denied sub
nom. Avis Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Marshall, 484 U.S. 1065 (1988) ("Since Puerto Rico, a
civil law jurisdiction, never uses juries in civil cases, there is of course no Common-
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the guideline that federal courts in cases involving claims under state
law follow state substance and federal procedure, 6 because the Constitution is our paramount law it would be misleading and beside the
point to engage in any classification of either the federal law or conflicting state law as substantive or procedural. If the federal rule is
one of constitutional law, it governs, period.
2.

Acts of Congress

For the many acts of Congress in Tite 28 and elsewhere that govern various aspects of procedure in the federal courts, Hanna-acase
involving a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, not a statute-hinted
heavily that such statutes had only to be constitutional under a broad
view of congressional authority to regulate federal court procedure.
[T]he constitutional provision for a federal court system (augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause) carries with it congressional power to make rules governing the practice and pleading in
those courts, which in turn includes a power to regulate matters

which, though falling within the uncertain area between substance
as either. Cf.
and procedure, are rationally capable of classification
7
M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421.3

The Court's citation to Chief Justice Marshall's famously expansive
view of congressionl power in M'Culloch3 8 emphasizes the scope
wealth law on this subject. The Seventh Amendment, however, most decidedly affords litigants in federal court in Puerto Rico the right to trial byjury. .. .") (footnote
omitted).
36 See, e.g., Hanna,380 U.S. at 465 ("The broad command ofEfiewas... identical
to that of the Enabling Act: federal courts are to apply state substantive law and federal procedural law.").
37 Id. at 472. The Necessary and Proper Clause specifically refers to Congress'
power not only to make laws for carrying out its own enumerated powers, but also
"[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution.., all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18, leaving
no room for doubt that Congress can legislate concerning such matters as federal
court jurisdiction and procedure. The Court in Hanna went on to emphasize this
point: "Erieand its offspring cast no doubt on the long-recognized power of Congress
to prescribe housekeeping rules for federal courts even though some of those rules
will inevitably differ from comparable state rules." Hanna, 380 U.S. at 473.
38 M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819):
[W]e think the sound construction of the constitution must allow to the
national legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by which the
powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable that
body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted
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Hanna affords for procedural statutes and seems to warrant Justice
Harlan's characterization in his concurrence of the test for such provisions as "arguably procedural, ergo constitutional." 39 Harlan appears
to have meant his phrase as a criticism of the majority's approach to
the validity of a Federal Rule promulgated under the REA, but it
seems both accurate and unproblematic when applied to an act of
Congress.
The Court's leading post-Hannacase involving a procedural statute, Stewart Organization v. Ricoh Corp.,40 strongly confirmed the approach sketched in Hanna:
If the district court determines that a federal statute covers the
point in dispute, it proceeds to inquire whether the statute represents a valid exercise of Congress' authority under the Constitution.... If Congress intended to reach the issue before the District

Court, and if it enacted its intention into law in a manner that
abides with the Constitution, that is the end of the matter;
with
"[f] ederal courts are bound to apply rules enacted by Congress
41
respect to matters ...

over which it has legislative power."

Having interpreted the federal venue-transfer statute before it in Stewart Organizationto "control[ ] the issue before the District Court," the
Supreme Court quoted the language from Hanna reproduced above
and pronounced "[t]he constitutional authority of Congress to enact"
the provision as being "not subject to serious question."4 2 The statute
being "doubtless capable of classification as a procedural rule," it
therefore fell "comfortably within Congress' powers under Article III
as augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause." 43
The unqualified sweep of these statements can raise the question
whether the Court fully means what it appears to have been saying,
particularly after recent cases such as United States v. Lape, 44 which
place limits on other broadly construed congressional powers. Yet
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, memto that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of
the constitution, are constitutional.
(footnote omitted).
39 Hanna,380 U.S. at 476 (Harlan, J., concurring).
40 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
41 Id. at 27 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted) (quoting Prima Paint Corp. v.
Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 406 (1967)).
42 Stewart Org., 487 U.S. at 31-32.
43 Id. at 32.
44 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down federal statute criminalizing possession of
firearm in school zone as exceeding congressional authority under Commerce
Clause, such possession not being economic activity with substantial impact on interstate commerce).
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bers of the fivejustice Lopez majority, all joined the opinion of the
Court in Stewart Organization, and Justice Scalia's lone dissent appeared to stem largely from his disagreement with the Court's broad
construction of the federal venue-transfer statute. 45 Gasperiniprovides
no reason to expect a change in the Court's view of the breadth of
Congress' power to legislate concerning federal court procedure,
even though it held the NewYork verdict-excessiveness standard applicable; the case did not involve a federal statute, and the three main
dissenters (Jusdce Scalia, joined by .Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas) ironically would have favored application of federal
law.

46

The realistic checks on Congress in this area accordingly seem to
be those of politics and good sense, rather than constitutional limits.
A federal statute of limitations governing state claims in federal court,
overriding otherwise applicable state law, would thus be constitutional4 7 (although a terrible idea and one that even Congress could be
trusted not to adopt). Statutes of limitations, while serving the substantive concern of real-world repose and rightly treated as substantive
for some Erie purposes, 48 are also "arguably procedural" given their
housekeeping concern with defining what claims are and are not too
stale for the courts to be obliged to entertain. 49 Likewise, a loser-pays
45 See Stewart Org., 487 U.S. at 34-38 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
46 See Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2211, 2236-40 (1996)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Seventh Amendment's re-examination clause,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59, and proper application of Erie jurisprudence
would require federal trial courts to apply federal standard in reviewing size of jury
verdict, without review by courts of appeals).
47 See Ely, supra note 29, at 726 ("Congress could constitutionally enact a statute
prescribing a limitation period for diversity cases") (footnote omitted); Paul D. Carrington, "Substance" and "Procedure"in the Rules EnablingAct, 1989 DUKE L.J. 281, 294
(Congress' power to create inferior courts under Article III "implies a power (not yet
exercised) to bar a claim as being too stale to be heard in its federal courts, although
it would not be barred in the forum of the sovereignty that created the asserted right.
Article Il also may imply a power to direct a district court to hear a claim that would
be deemed too stale to be heard in the forum of the sovereignty creating the asserted
right. If valid, limitations law made pursuant to Article III is so because it is, at least,
marginally procedural.") (footnote omitted).
48 See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109-12 (1945) (holding state statute of limitations controlling in equity case to enforce state-created right brought in
federal court under diversity jurisdiction).
49 See Ely, supranote 29, at 726 ("[S] tatutes of limitation are passed not simply for
the substantive purpose of relieving people's minds after the passage of the designated period, but also for procedural purposes, to keep down the size of the docket
and to ensure that cases will not be tried on evidence so stale as to cast doubt on its
trustworthiness.").

NOTRE

DAME LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 73:4

attorney-fee provision for diversity cases in the federal courts50 could
be constitutional under Congress' authority to regulate federal court
procedure, even though the states generally do not treat attorney fees
as a recoverable element of damages, at least if the purposes of such a
provision included affecting forum choices and incentives for the
51
bringing and conduct of litigation.
If I am reading the cases correctly, Congress' power to legislate
52
concerning procedure in the federal courts is very broad indeed.
That does not make irrelevant the Erie concerns for forum-shopping
incentives and the integrity of state law. It does, though, mean that
where these concerns should be taken into account is in the legislative
process, with the adoption and framing of legislation governing the
federal judiciary influenced by considering whether a potential federal law would create too much disparity between state and federal
court practice or would undermine legitimate concerns of state law.
Once Congress has acted, though, the breadth of its power and the
Court's deferential approach mean that "arguably procedural" federal
laws are valid and governing in federal court. That leaves no room for
balancing, which Congress already has or should have done itself. It
also limits the role of definitional debate over "substance" and "proce50 See Common Sense Legal Reforms Act of 1995, H.R. 10, 104th Cong. § 101
(1995) (proposed 28 U.S.C. § 1332(e) (1)) ("The district court that exercises jurisdiction in a civil action commenced under this section shall award to the party that
prevails with respect to a claim in such action an attorney's fee .. . ").
51 See Attorney Accountability: Hearingson H.R. 10 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and
IntellectualProperty of the House Comm. on theJudiciary,104th Cong. 15 (1995) ("Overuse
and abuse of the legal system impose tremendous costs upon American taxpayers,
businesses, and consumers.") (statement of Hon. Jim Ramstad); id. at 17 ("[I] n order
to discourage frivolous lawsuits and promote settlement of meritorious cases we have
adopted a modified version of the English rule.") (statement of Hon. Jim Ramstad);
id. at 22 ("Something must be done to stop the virulent spread of... abusive and
wasteful litigation. That is why the central element of the Common Sense Legal Reform Act is the full recovery rule[,] . . . a necessary part of the cure to America's
lawsuit epidemic. It expedites the resolution of strong cases and deters the filing of
frivolous ones.") (statement of Hon. Christopher Cox); id. at 23 ("If I am a plaintiff
and I believe my case is strong, I can file even my State claims in Federal court in
diversity cases. By doing so, I can ensure that I will be made whole in the courts, and
that my claim will be fully vindicated. On the other hand, if... I am risk averse, I can
avoid the loser-pays rule by filing in State court.") (statement of Hon. Christopher
Cox).
52 For a similar interpretation, see Ides, supra note 16, at 77:
The lesson to be learned from Ricoh is that a federal procedural statute
trumps contrary state law in a diversity case so long as the federal statute is
designed to apply to the circumstances and so long as the federal statute can
be classified as procedural. As to the latter, the test is, in essence, one of
highly deferential rational basis.
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dure." All that matters is that the federal statute pass the "arguably
procedural" test; the "substantive" or "procedural" nature of any conflicting state law is irrelevant because constitutionally valid federal law
is supreme and prevails whatever the source or character of the state
53
law in question.
3.

Federal Rules Promulgated Under the Enabling Act

Since Hannait has been clear that the validity of a candidate Federal Rule that covers the point at issue is to be judged by reference to
the charter for the Federal Rules, the Rules Enabling Act.54 As a
unanimous Court later put it in Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v.
Woods,55 a Federal Rule that
when fairly construed... is "sufficiently broad" to cause a "direct
collision" with the state law or, implicitly, to "control the issue"
before the court, thereby leaving no room for the operation of that
law . .. must then be applied if it represents a valid exercise of
Congress's rulemaking authority, which originates in the Constitution and has been bestowed on this Court by the Rules Enabling
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072.
The constitutional constraints on the exercise of this rulemaking authority define a test of reasonableness. Rules regulating matters indisputably procedural are a priori constitutional. Rules
regulating matters "which, though falling within the uncertain area
between substance and procedure, are rationally capable of classification as either," also satisfy this constitutional standard. [Quoting
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472.] The Rules Enabling Act, however, contains an additional requirement. The Federal Rule must not
"abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right...." 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072. The cardinal purpose of Congress in authorizing the development of a uniform and consistent system of rules governing federal practice and procedure suggests that Rules which incidentally
affect litigants' substantive rights do not violate this provision if reasonably necessary to maintain the integrity of that system of rules.
Moreover, the study and approval given each proposed Rule by the
Advisory Committee, the Judicial Conference, and this Court, and
the statutory requirement that the Rule be-reported to Congress for
a period of review before taking effect, see 28 U.S.C. § 2072, give
53 See id. at 77-78 ("If the federal statute is broad enough to cover the circumstances and is constitutionally valid as a procedural enactment the federal statute
must be applied regardless of state law to the contrary.").
54 For the pertinent text of the Act, see supra note 30.
55 480 U.S. 1 (1987).
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the Rules presumptive validity under both the constitutional and
56
statutory constraints.
With the Court itself providing such an authoritative and reasonably

comprehensive distillation, a temptation that an academic expositor
must beware is that of embellishing too much. Still, there remain

some implications and uncertainties worth considering. First, here as
with federal procedural statutes, the Court's approach appears to
leave little room, or far more likely none at all, for Byrd-style balancing
of state interests. 57 The Court speaks of the REA's statutory authorization in § 2072 (a), which now gives the Supreme Court "power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of
evidence," 5 8 as if it is fully coextensive with the constitutional scope of
Congress' broad authority to legislate concerning federal-court proce-

56 Id. at 4-6 (footnote and some citations omitted).
57 See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 535-40 (1958) (considering
state rule on judge rather than jury determination of issue in question and "whether it
is bound up with [state-created] rights and obligations in such a way that its application in the federal court is required" or is "merely a form and mode" of enforcement,
and noting "affirmative countervailing consideration[ " of independent federal judicial system's "strong federal policy against allowing state rules to disrupt the judge-jury
relationship in the federal courts," and "likelihood of a different result" from following federal rule). For a summary of the status of Byrd in cases involving a Federal Rule
after Hanna,see 17JAMEs WM. MOORE ET AL., MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcTICE § 124.06, at
124-39 to -40 (3d ed. 1998) (footnote omitted):
It appears that the Court intended the Rules Enabling Act analysis to
supplant Byrd for cases involving a conflict between [F]ederal [R]ules and
state law. Neither the Hanna opinion, nor the Court's later opinion in Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v. Woods... suggest[s] that balancing state and
federal interest[s] has any role in the Rules Enabling Act analysis.

58

28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (1994).
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dure59-for which the Court focuses solely on whether the federal law
60
in question is within the scope of that authority.

If balancing were to have any role in this context, it could take
place only because the REA goes on in § 2072(b) to place on rules
promulgated by the Court the limit, which does not constrain Congress' power to make laws governing federal court procedure, that
such rules "shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
right."6 1 Yet nothing in the Court's opinions since Hannaspeaks as if
balancing is how it means for federal courts to determine whether
procedural rules promulgated under the REA have the forbidden substantive impact. And the statutory language, of course, forbids substantive effects, implying strongly that if any were found they would
invalidate a Federal Rule at least as applied, rather than allow some
substantive impact as long as it were not too great or seemed well
enough justified. If it were to be concluded that federal procedural
law should be able to "abridge, enlarge or modify" a substantive right
under state or nonconstitutional federal law, after all, there is a
straightforward and unquestionably valid way to do it: have Congress
pass a statute.
All this leaves the question whether and if so under what circumstances the Supreme Court or the lower federal courts might or
should find a Federal Rule promulgated under its REA authority to
have the kind of substantive effect the REA appears to forbid. The
59 Professor Ides plausibly argues that the scope of the Court's REA authority to
promulgate "general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence" might
not encompass altering the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts, which of course
Congress may do. Ides, supra note 16, at 81-82. He suggests a distinction between
"rules that can be fairly characterized as housekeeping matters and rules more appropriately described as architectural or house building," while granting that "as a practical matter the federal rules are not likely to present a house building problem." Id. at
81. An intermediate form of rulemaking authority that Congress has recently
granted, however, empowers the Supreme Court to promulgate rules affecting appellatejurisdicion-both rules that "define when a ruling of a district court is final for
the purposes of appeal under [28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994)]," 28 U.S.C. § 2072(c) (1994),
and rules "to provide for an appeal of an interlocutory decision to the courts of appeals that is not otherwise provided for under [28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)-(d) (1994)]," 28
U.S.C. § 1292(e) (1994).
60 See supra text accompanying note 53.
61 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1994). Professor Ely argues that balancing "would be a
good deal more defensible in the Enabling Act context" than with purely decisional
federal rules because the REA is concerned "quite overtly, with both sides of the uneasy tension between federal procedural reform and state nonprocedural policies."
He does not advocate a balancing approach under the REA, though, partly because
"the statutory language provides no semblance of basis for any such interpretation."
Ely, supra note 29, at 725 n.171.
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Court has repeatedly nodded in its Erie-Hanna cases toward the
"abridge, enlarge or modify' language 62 while adhering to its strong
presumption of the validity of the Federal Rules, emphasizing that
merely incidental effects are not proscribed 63 and upholding every
challenged Federal Rule it has found to conflict with state law.64 (This
62 See Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., 498 U.S. 533,
551 (1991) ("The [Rules Enabling] Act authorizes the Court 'to prescribe general
rules of practice and procedure,' but provides that such rules 'shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right."'); Burlington Northern, 480 U.S. at 5 ("The
Rules Enabling Act, however, contains an additional requirement. The Federal Rule
must not 'abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right .... '"); Hanna,380 U.S. at
464 (quoting text of REA); id. at 473 (reference to federal courts "measuring a Federal Rule against the standards contained in the Enabling Act and the Constitution").
63 See, e.g., BurlingtonNorthern, 480 U.S. at 5 ("Rules which incidentally affect litigants' substantive rights do not violate [the REA's substantive-rights] provision if reasonably necessary to maintain the integrity of that system of rules."); Hanna,380 U.S.
at 465 ("Congress' prohibition of any alteration of substantive rights of litigants was
obviously not addressed to such incidental effects as necessarily attend the adoption
of the prescribed new rules of procedure upon the rights of litigants who, agreeably
to rules of practice and procedure, have been brought before a court authorized to
determine their rights.") (quoting Mississippi Pub. Co. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445
(1946)). Thus, if federal discovery practice differed from that in state courts in such a
way as to make a potentially outcome-affecting difference in the information accessible to litigants, without affecting the state substantive law governing the effect of that
evidence, such an effect would not run afoul of the statutory ban on changing
substance.
64 See, e.g., Burlington Northern, 480 U.S. 1 (1987) (upholding discretionary frivolous-appeal sanction of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 over conflicting
mandatory-affirmance penalty under state law); Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470 ("The Erie
rule has never been invoked to void a Federal Rule."). Professor Stephen Burbank,
drawing upon extensive historical study of the Rules Enabling Act, makes the logical
point that the ban on affecting substantive rights goes to having the proscribed impact on rights under federal as well as state law. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules
Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1113-14, 1123-24 (1982). However,
neither the Supreme Court nor, as far as I know, any lower federal court has ever
dealt with a case involving a challenge to a federal rule as abridging, enlarging, or
modifying a substantive right under federal as opposed to state law.
A threshold issue on which I have nothing to add to others' discussions is just
what constitutes a "substantive" right. Professor Ely's concise and useful if somewhat
circular definition is "a right granted for one or more nonprocedural reasons, for
some purpose or purposes not having to do with the fairness or efficiency of the
litigation process." Ely, supranote 29, at 725 (footnote omitted). He goes on to note
"the possibility that a rule can be both procedural and substantive, when it is informed by both procedural and nonprocedural purposes." Id. at 725 n.172. Professor
Ides uses terms that also refer to the aims underlying a rule of law, in a definition that
seems as if it would work in much the same way as Ely's: "Substantive law refers to that
body of principles designed to regulate primary human activity; procedural law refers
to that body of principles designed to provide a means for adjudicating controversies
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issue of possible invalidity of a Federal Rule for affecting substantive
fights is of considerable academic interest, including to the academic
now at the keyboard. It is, though, a rarity in the real world and of
limited practical significance. Readers who do not share the writer's
interest may wish to skip to the beginning of Section 4 below.)
The disregard of incidental impacts makes it apparent that the
number of situations that might even raise a serious problem of a Federal Rule, valid as "procedural" under the authorization of § 2072 (a),
having the substantive effect proscribed by § 2072(b) will in practice
be extremely small. 65 Genuinely procedural rules do not do such
things as, say, defining rights and defenses relating to primary conduct. Indeed, Professor Burbank's history of the Rules Enabling Act
argues that the substantive-rights proviso was surplusage, in that the
Act's framers did not see it as having independent force beyond the
limits on the basic grant of procedural rulemaking authority: the proviso "served only to emphasize a restriction inherent in the use of the
word 'procedure' in the first sentence" of the REA. 66 This view would

not necessarily mean that a valid procedural rule could affect substantive rights, for "the first sentence itself was thought to impose significant restrictions on court rulemaking.167 Rather, the framers may not
have conceived of the possibility that a legitimately procedural rule
over rights derived from the substantive law." Ides, supra note 16, at 82. The
Supreme Court seems to regard the purposes apparently animating a law as relevant
in deciding on whether it should be regarded as substantive or procedural, for the
Gasperini majority opinion spoke of the "manifestly substantive" character of "the
State's objective" underlying New York's "deviates materially" standard of review for
excessiveness or inadequacy ofjury verdicts. See Gasperiniv. Centerfor Humanities, Inc.,
116 S. Ct. 2211, 2220 (1996).
65 The only appellate decision, and the only reported decision in the last twenty
years, finding such a conflict that appears in the Westlaw annotations to 28 U.S.CA.
§ 2072 is Douglas v. NCNB Texas NationalBank, 979 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1992). Texas
law permits a lender with a contractual right to nonjudicial foreclosure to choose that
remedy, even when sued by the borrower in state court and able to pursue judicial
foreclosure by way of counterclaim. The Fifth Circuit characterized the lender's right
to choose judicial or nonjudicial foreclosure as substantive, holding that applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a) on compulsory counterclaims would abridge the
lender's substantive rights and enlarge those of the debtor by letting it "force the
lender to pursue ajudicial foreclosure remedy." Id. at 1130.
The conflict between Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) on relation back and
a more liberal state provision that led to the First Circuit's decision in Marshall v.
Mulrenin,508 F.2d 39 (1st Cir. 1974), to regard the state rule as substantive and follow
it, has been eliminated by the 1991 amendment permitting relation back when it "is
permitted by the law that provides the statute of limitations applicable to the action."
FED. R. CIv. P. 15(c)(1).
66 Burbank, supra note 64, at 1108.
67 Id.
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could at least in any objectionable sense "abridge, enlarge or modify
'68
any substantive right.
But procedural rules can, in situations that will be rare but are
not that hard to imagine, do exactly that. Such rules may, of course,
affect outcomes by affording (or denying) in federal court a procedural opportunity lacking (or available) in state court; but such cases
would present no more than the permitted incidental impact on substance. Especially given the broad power legitimated by the Supreme
Court's "arguably procedural" approach, though, a rule that came
within the procedural rulemaking power could collide directly with
other law that merited treatment as substantive for REA purposes.
Such other law would almost certainly itself be in a border area between substance and procedure, serving a mix of procedural and substantive purposes rather than defining primary rights, obligations,
defenses, and so on, of the sort virtually certain not to clash directly
even with an "arguably procedural" Federal Rule.
Perhaps the clearest example of a rule creating a direct conflict
would be a "rule of limitatons"-a hypothetical Federal Rule promulgated under the REA that defined limitations periods for state or, for
that matter, federal claims in federal court. Probably in all applications, but at least to the extent that it kept claims alive by providing a
period longer than that authorized by legislation (rather than just having a short period that forced claimants into state court 69 ), such a rule
would not incidentally but directly abridge substantive rights of the
defendant and enlarge those of the plaintiff.70 Despite the validity of
68 The Supreme Court has never made it plain that it can conceive of the possibility, either, which provides a basis for some doubt whether it would be willing to strike
down for violating § 2072(b) a Federal Rule that was at least "arguably procedural"
and thus within the general § 2072(a) authority.

[T] he possibility that a Rule could fairly be labeled procedural and at the
same time abridge or modify substantive rights was one the Court [in Sibbach
v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941)] was unwilling to accept; by its lights,

either a Rule was procedural or it affected substantive rights ....This construction has been widely accepted by the literature and has continued to

inform the Court's discussions.
Ely, supra note 29, at 719-20 (footnotes omitted).
69 The problems created by removal in such a situation could be knotty, if a plain-

tiff filed in state court where a long statute of limitations governed and a defendant
removed to federal court with the shorter "rule of limitations." But they would be so
only if such a rule-whose proposal by the rulemaking process and promulgation by
the Supreme Court seem inconceivable-were held valid, which it almost certainly
should not be.
70 See Ely, supra note 29, at 726-27 ("[A] Federal Rule prescribing [a limitation
period for diversity cases] would satisfy the Enabling Act's first sentence. It should
not get by the second sentence, however, for the substantive rights established by state

1998]

THE SUPREME

COURT'S ERIE-JVANA

JURISPRUDENCE

981

such a provision if enacted by Congress, 7 it should be invalid under
§ 2072(b) if promulgated under the REA.
The breadth of the procedural rulemaking power, and the force
of hypothetical examples such as the "rule of limitations,"7 2 convince
me that despite Professor Burbank's history the REA's substantiverights proviso should not today be read as surplusage. Nor do I predict that it would be so read if the rare case of an unavoidable collision between a Federal Rule promulgated under the REA and a right
under substantive law were to move beyond the realm of the hypothetical. Even moderate versions of plain-language interpretation would
give weight to the existence of separate sentences of statutory text conferring the procedural rulemaking authority and imposing the substantive-rights limit-and avoidably reading independent meaning
out of statutory language violates elementary construction canons.7 3
Indeed, the Supreme Court's post-Hannamentions of the substantiverights proviso have emphasized its distinctness from the REA's general
grant of authority to make procedural rules.7 4
statutes of limitations would be abridged by applying such a Federal Rule.") (footnote
omitted). For legislative history indicating that some framers of the Rules Enabling
Act regarded limitations law as entirely outside the procedural rule-making power, see
Burbank, supra note 64, at 1085-89. For an argument that legislative history should
not be dispositive and that practice has sanctioned at least limitations-affecting provisions in Federal Rules such as those dealing with tolling in Rule 3 and relation back in
Rule 15(c), see Carrington, supra note 47, at 307-10.
71 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
72 See also supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text (asserting validity of loserpays attorney-fee provision for diversity cases in federal court if enacted by Congress).
A rule under the REA purporting to establish loser-pays fee shifting would conflict
with many state and federal statutes creating different fee-award schemes, often
linked to particular substantive areas. See Stephen B. Burbank, Proposals to Amend Rule
68-Time to Abandon Ship, 19 U. Micmi.J.L. REFORM 425, 433 (1986) ("Animating some
statutory attorney's fees provisions, notably in the civil rights area, is Congress' conviction that the vindication of substantive rights is inextricably linked to arrangements
for fees.") (footnote omitted). Even absent such conflicts with fee-award statutes, general loser-pays fee shifting by a Federal Rule should be invalid under § 2072(b) in
states where the background American rule of no fee shifting appeared to reflect a
substantive decision against awarding fees as an element of compensatory damages,
rather than just a procedural definition of what fell outside recoverable litigation
costs.
73 See 2A NoRMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.06,
at 119-20 (5th ed. 1992) ("A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all
its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or
insignificant.").
74 See supranote 62; Ides, supranote 16, at 82 ("The Court has expressly noted the
relevance of [the substantive-rights] component as a separate concern in the determination of a rule's validity.").
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Whether to give teeth to § 2072(b) il the narrowly defined circumstance of a direct collision between a procedural rule and a substantive right is a problem the Supreme Court may never face, but one
that definitely could arise. A hypothetical can illustrate why according
independent force to the substantive-rights proviso in such a case
would yield a coherent interpretation of the REA consistent with existing Supreme Court approaches-and one not to be feared as
threatening the general validity of the Federal Rules. If a state were to
take personal privacy extremely seriously and pass a law of general
application banning all involuntary mental and physical examinations
in the state, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3575 would conflict with
the law and require a decision whether a federal court's ordering such
an examination would violate the substantive-rights proviso. The state
law's apparent purpose being general protection of personal privacy
and not just control of court procedure by banning such examinations in state court, a decision not to regard the law as creating a substantive right whose abridgement by a Federal Rule violated the REA
would constitute an unjustified refusal to give any effect to
§ 2072(b) 76
75

R. Civ. P. 35:
Order
for Examination. When the mental or physical condition... of a
(a)
party ... is in controversy, the court in which the action is pending may
order the party to submit to a physical or mental examination by a suitably
licensed or certified examiner ....
FED.

Rule 35 is generally valid under § 2072(a) as a rule regulating federal-court procedure. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941) ("The test must be whether a
rule really regulates procedure-the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties
recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for
disregard or infraction of them. That [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35 is] such is
admitted.").
76 It should make no difference whether the state had arrived at this policy by
constitutional amendment, statute, or common law decision. Although the source of
a candidate federal rule of law is crucial because the test for its validity differs depending on its derivation, these federal-law tests for whether a federal rule is valid and
governs are indifferent-as they should be-to how a state has made a policy decision. Cf Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (abolishing distinction, for
purposes of applicability of state law in federal court, between state statutory and common law). Further, in the text's hypothetical, it should make no difference for purposes of applicability of this particular state law whether a case was in federal court
because of diversity or federal-question jurisdiction; the abridgment of a substantive
state-law right would be the same, given the general applicability of the state law. See
Ely, supra note 29, at 737 n.226 ("The Enabling Act, in limiting Federal Rules promulgated for civil actions, indicates no distinction between diversity and federal question
cases."). Most of the time, of course, state law applicable under Erie-Hannagoverns
only in diversity cases or on the state-law aspects of claims in federal court under

1998]

THE SUPREME

COURT'S

ERIE-ANVVA

JURISPRUDENCE

983

The implications of this hypothetical may initially seem to pose
an intolerable threat to the general validity and the governing force of
the Federal Rules, but for several reasons there seems to be little real
ground for concern. First, you have to come up with a pretty strained
hypothetical to illustrate the possibility of a Federal Rule being invalid
for violating § 2072 (b), so such cases are likely to be vanishingly rare.
Second, unlike a Federal Rule that overstepped the § 2072 (a) authority to make procedural rules, invalidity of a Federal Rule for violating

the substantive-rights proviso might be no more than as applied where
a substantive, state provision collided directly with the Federal Rule;
the Rule would remain fully valid in other states lacking similar provisions. 7 7 Third, if a Federal Rule promulgated by the REA's
subordinate form of law-making authority-involving judicial-branch
committees and the Supreme Court, but not positive action by Congress 7 8 -directly affects state substantive rights or interests that a state
regards as warranting protection by substantive law, the states should
be able to override application of the Federal Rule. Finally, in the
virtually inconceivable event that such an override took place to begin
with, and it seemed an intolerable threat to the uniformity of federal-

court procedure, Congress by using its power to legislate for procedure in the federal courts could override the state provision. That, I
submit, is both the result of a sensible reading of the Enabling Act
consistent with what the Supreme Court has said in its REA cases and
a suitable allocation of power in a federalist democracy. The states
can override by their substantive law a subordinate form of federal
procedural rulemaking authority if they deem it important enough to

supplemental jurisdiction, because it is substantive law governing state-law claims and
defenses to them.
77 Indeed, the Federal Rule might remain valid in many applications even in the
state with the conflicting substantive provision, depending on how widely applicable
that provision was. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a), even if invalid when it
would deprive a Texas lender of the right to choose nonjudicial foreclosure, see supra
note 65, would be valid and governing in all other cases in Texas federal court,
whatever Texas does about counterclaims generally in its state courts. A Federal Rule
that was technically valid under § 2072 (a) might, though, be so broad as to affect
substantive rights impermissibly in all states, as would be the case with the hypothetical "rule of limitations." See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
78 See 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (1994) (establishing that rules promulgated by the
Supreme Court, which must be transmitted "to the Congress not later than May 1 of
the year in which a rule prescribed under § 2072 is to become effective... take effect
no earlier than December 1 of the year in which such rule is so transmitted unless
otherwise provided by law"-that is, unless Congress enacts a law preventing the rule
from taking effect).
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do so-but the highest national legislative body has final say over
whether any such state override should stand.
4. Purely Decisional Rules Governing Procedure in Federal Courts
Prominent in the early development of Erie doctrine, perhaps too
much so for purposes of students' understanding of the area today,
were decisions involving judge-made procedural federal common law
in conflict with the law that would govern in state court. Teaching
materials often include as leading cases between Erie and Hanna the
Supreme Court's opinions in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York79 and Byrd v.
Blue Ridge RuralElectric Cooperative, Inc.8 0 These two decisions respectively pitted the federal equitable doctrine of laches against a state
statute of limitations,8 ' and federal practice allocating an issue to deci82
sion by a jury against state precedent committing it to the judge.
York and Byrd are identified with the "outcome-determination" and
"interest-balancing" tests they seemed successively to espouse, and a
reader of these decisions before later developments could well have
come away thinking that the approach taken in each was meant to
apply to a wide range of Erie problems.
All that changed with the Court's decision in Hanna,which first
in dictum recast the York outcome-determination analysis for cases in3
volving decisional federal law as the modern "twin aims" emphasis, 8
and then-in a part of the opinion that qualifies as a holding-went
79 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
80 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
81 Justice Frankfurter's opinion for the Court in York does not mention laches,
but that federal equitable doctrine with its flexible emphasis on the reasons for delay
in filing and possible prejudice from the delay must be the source of the problem of
conflict with the bright-line state statute of limitations. See Ides, supra note 16, at

85-86 (discussing the relation between laches and statute of limitations in York). Justice Rutledge's dissent does refer to the doctrine and to statutes of limitations being
generally less "rigidly applicable as absolute barriers to suits in equity [than] they are
to actions at law." York, 326 U.S. at 114, 119 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (footnote
omitted).

82 For an example of a casebook including York and Byrd as the only two principal
cases between Erie and Hanna,see STEPHEN C. YEAZEL,CIVrI PROCEDuRE 262-69 (4th
ed. 1996). I do not fault such treatment and indeed cover both York and Byrd when I
teach Civil Procedure-but briefly, and emphasizing that they do not fully represent
the modem approach or methods that can be applied generally across the range of
Erie-Hannaissues.
83 See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468 ("The 'outcome-determination' test ...cannot be
read without reference to the twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forumshopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.") (footnote omitted). The dictum portion of the Hanna opinion about cases involving decisional federal procedural law runs from page 466 to page 469.
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on to distinguish cases in which a Federal Rule might apply.8 4 Those
latter situations, unlike ones involving decisional federal rules, are
governed by the REA analysis discussed in the immediately preceding
section of this essay. Since Hanna,the Court has regularly referred to
the "twin aims" approach for decisional-law cases, which are often regarded as arising under (if at most loosely governed by) the Rules of
Decision Act.8 5 The clearest pre-Gasperinistatement of the approach

since Hanna came in dictum in the Stewart Organizationcase, which
the Court viewed as one involving a governing federal statute:
If no federal statute or Rule covers the point in dispute, the
district court then proceeds to evaluate whether application of federal judge-made law would disserve the so-called "twin-aims of the
Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws." If application of federal judgemade law would disserve these two policies, the district court should
apply state law.

86

Only once in the three decades between Hanna and Gasperini, in
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.,8 7 did the Court face what it treated as a case
involving a conflict between state law and decisional federal procedural law-in NASCO, federal courts' inherent authority to impose
sanctions for bad-faith conduct in a diversity case, even if the state

courts would not act similarly. justice White's majority opinion routinely invoked and applied the "twin aims" approach, finding no forum-shopping incentives or inequity and upholding the federal
practice.8 8 Also, years before in Walker the Court applied the "twin
aims" analysis 89 even "in the absence of a federal rule directly on
84 Id. at 469-74.
85 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1994) ("The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or
provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the
United States, in cases where they apply."). For commentary treating decisional-law
cases as coming under the rubric of the Rules of Decision Act, see, for example, Ely,
supra note 29, at 707-18, and Ides, supra note 16, at 83. The great generality of the
Act's "in cases where they apply" phrasing concerning state laws in the federal courts
gives little if any guidance as to when they should apply, leaving just how to make the
"relatively unguided Erie choice," Hanna,380 U.S. at 471, up to judicial interpretation
of the sort the Court has provided in Erie, York, and Hanna.
86 Stewart Org., 487 U.S. at 27 n.6. (quoting Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468, and citing
Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. at 752-53).
87 501 U.S. 32 (1991).
88 Id. at 51-55.
89 Walker, 446 U.S. at 753 ("[Allthough in this case failure to apply the state service law might not create any problem of forum shopping, the result would be an
'inequitable administration' of the law." (footnote omitted) (quoting Hanna,380 U.S.
at 468)).
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point,"90 perhaps because failure to apply state law would require cre-

ation of federal decisional law to fill a gap.
In all these invocations of the Hanna "twin aims" test, the Court
cited cases from before and after Byrd-chiefly Erie, York, and Hanna
itself-but never referred to Byrd.91 Hanna itself had cited Byrd but
only for the general proposition that " [o]utcome-determination analysis was never intended to serve as a talisman." 92 Whatever the lower
federal courts were doing,9 3 the Supreme Court never returned to
Byrd-style balancing; and the last time before Gasperini that a Court
majority cited Byrd was in 1977, in a per curiam opinion, along with
Hannafor the proposition that "[t]he proper role of the trial and appellate courts in the federal system in reviewing the size of jury verdicts is . . . a matter of federal law."'94 This treatment left Byrd in a

puzzling limbo as a case never overruled but studiously avoided at the
Supreme Court level; commentators were in disagreement over
whether and to what extent it did and should survive. 95
90 Id. at 752.
91 See also Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 726-27 (1988) ("In the context
of our Eriejurisprudence .... th[e] purpose [for which the "substance-procedure"
dichotomy is drawn] is to establish (within the limits of applicable federal law, including the prescribed Rules of Federal Procedure) substantial uniformity of predictable
outcome between cases tried in a federal court and cases tried in the courts of the
State in which the federal court sits." (citing York and Hanna but not Byrd)); Walker,
446 U.S. at 747 (quoting "twin aims" from Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468, with references to
Erie and York but no mention of Byrd).
92 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 466-67 (citing Byr4, 356 U.S. at 537).
93 See 19 CHARl.Fs ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4504, at
49-50 (2d ed. 1996) ("[A] number of courts since the Hanna case have continued to
refer to the Byrd case and rely upon its interest-balancing approach, especially with
regard to matters involving the judge-jury relationship in the federal courts.") (footnote omitted).
94 Donovan v. Penn Shipping Co., 429 U.S. 648, 649-50 (1977) (per curiam).
Donovan "reaffirm led] the longstanding rule that a plaintiff in federal court, whether
prosecuting a state or federal cause of action, may not appeal from a remittitur order
he has accepted." Id. at 650.
95 Compare, e.g., Ides, supra note 16, at 86-87 ("My view would be that Byrd is no
longer useful law ....But since Byrd has never been expressly overruled, the potential
for Byrd-balancing must be considered an aspect" of the analysis for cases involving
federal judge-made law.) (footnote omitted), with, e.g., 19 WRIor ET AL., supra note
93, § 4511, at 312, 313, 314 (describing Byrd as "a good starting place for analyzing the
Erie problem" in cases not involving a federal statute or Federal Rule, with neither its
"interest-balancing technique nor the many other aspects of the Byrd decision" seemingly "weakened by Hanna," but noting that "[t]he most obvious context for applying
the Byrd test is in cases involving conflicting state-federal attitudes regarding the relationship of judge and jury"). For a more extensive listing of views in case law and
commentary on the status of Byrd after Hanna, see King, supra note 12, at 173 n.77.
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For present purposes, since Byrd made a limited reappearance in
Gasperini,there is no need to go into detail about how the tea leaves
might most justifiably have been read beforehand. But for evaluating
arguments made after the Court's latest Erie-Hanna decision about
whether it did or did not mark a major departure, it is worth observing that anyone who in (at least) the last ten or so years had
thought-or worse, taught-that Byrd was the dominant approach
with current sanction by the Supreme Court for general application in
cases involving judge-made federal procedural law had not been paying close attention to the Court's recent decisions. It would be one
thing to argue for the virtues of Byrd-style balancing, 96 or to warn of
the need to take Byrd into account where lower federal courts continued-however questionably-to invoke it. 97 It would be quite another if one overlooked the evidence of the Hanna"twin aims" dictum
and its repeated invocation in Walker, Stewart Organization,and especially the NASCO holding to expect the Court to treat its virtually ignored Byrd decision as "the dominant precedent ' 98 for this area.
Instead, the "twin aims" approach that has prevailed here is a refined version of the "outcome-determination" test originally articulated in the following terms by York
The question is whether [a statute of limitations] concerns merely
the manner and the means by which a right to recover, as recognized by the State, is enforced, or whether such statutory limitation
is a matter of substance in the aspect that alone is relevant to our
problem, namely, does it significantly affect the result of a litigation
for a federal court to disregard a law of a State that would be con96

See, e.g., MARTN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION:
211-46 (2d ed. 1990).

TENSIONS IN THE ALLoCA-

TION OFJuDiciAL POWER

97 See, e.g., Ides, supra note 16, at 86.
98 The Supreme Court, 1995 Term, supra note 6, at 257; see MARY KAY KANE, CIVIL
PROCEDURE INA NUTSHELL 280-81 (4th ed. 1996) (stating that for cases not involving
a Federal Rule, a federal court "would proceed" by four-factor balancing analysis in-

cluding substantive nature of state law, outcome determinative impact, federal interest in avoiding state law or applying federal law, and effect on federalism, with
citations to York and Byrd); cf. Edie C. Grinblat, Comment, Gasperini in Line with Erie:
New York Law DeterminesExcessiveness of Verdict in Diversity Cases, 13 Touao L. RPv. 675,
683 (1997) (footnote omitted):
[I] nstead of applying Byrd's more recent balancing test, the Gasperini
Court utilized the "outcome-determination" test set forth in the earlier Guaranty Trust Company [case]. This only served to further confuse this already
obscure realm of Eriejurisprudence, not only since Byrd was the more recent
Erie precedent, but because it involved the most similar Erie-line conflict to
Gasperini
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trolling in an action upon the same claim by the same parties in a
State court?99
Hanna steered away from more sweeping renditions of York that had
seemed to threaten uniform application of the Federal Rules, 100 readings that had been questionable because they appeared to heed
neither York's acknowledgment of the possibility of a federal court's
ignoring a state rule concerning "merely the manner and the
means"1 0 1 of enforcing rights nor its emphasis on avoiding, not all
state-federal differences, but "[t]he operation of a double system of
10 2
conflicting laws in the same State."
In articulating the "twin-aims" gloss on the "outcome-determination" test, the Hanna majority explained with terms that both focus
the test and implicitly counsel against general balancing:
[W] hen a federal court sitting in a diversity case is faced with a question of whether or not to apply state law, the importance of a state
rule is indeed relevant, but only in the context of asking whether
application of the rule would make so important a difference to the
character or result of the litigation that failure to enforce it would
unfairly discriminate against citizens of the forum State, or whether
application of the rule would have so important an effect upon the
fortunes of one or both of the litigants that failure to enforce it
would be likely to cause a plaintiff to choose the federal court.10 3
99 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
100 See, e.g., supra note 4 (citing cases and commentary).
101 York, 326 U.S. at 109.
102 Id. at 112.
103 Hanna,380 U.S. at 468 n.9. The Court has repeatedly spoken in its Erie cases
of concern for discrimination against forum-state citizens, see, e.g. Walker, 446 U.S. at
745; Erie, 304 U.S. at 74, but that emphasis is only mostly right. Whoever controls a
state-federal forum choice may be able to benefit from any differences between the
two systems. While out-of-staters often control the forum choice through such means
as deciding whether to bring a diversity case in federal court or in a state court from
which a home-state defendant may not remove, see 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (b) (1994), sometimes home-state plaintiffs may control the choice by either suing in federal court or
joining a co-citizen defendant to destroy complete diversity and make a case unremovable from state court. It would therefore be more accurate to speak of discrimination
in favor of parties who control the choice of forum-which is still a legitimate concern implicating the equity in law-administration to which the Court refers.
Similarly, stress on forum-shopping by itself can seem misplaced or exaggerated
in a system that legitimizes forum choice by providing for concurrent state and federal court jurisdiction over many actions. The real problem appears to be whether
litigants can gain unfairly from a difference in applicable law when they forum shop,
so that the concern for forum shopping may best be considered not in isolation but in
tandem with the concern to avoid inequitable administration of the laws. See, e.g., Ely,
supra note 29, at 710 ("[Florum shopping is not an evil per se. It is evil only if something evil flows from it."); John C. McCoid II, Hanna v. Plumer: The Erie Doctrine
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As Professors Wright, Miller, and Cooper sum it up, "Outcome determination analysis is not repudiated by the Hanna case; rather, it is
refined by tying it to the policies of the Erie case, and it is limited to
those genuine Erie cases in which the choice-of-law question does not
involve a [F] ederal [R]ule.' u 0 4 Nor, of course, does Hannarepudiate
York's choice of the state statute of limitations to govern on a state
claim in federal court. Under Hanna's purposive version of the outcome-determination analysis, a party barred from state court by a state
statute of limitations would have ample reason to choose federal court
if the latter offered a chance to argue around a somewhat more flexible federal laches rule. And success in that effort would inequitably
deprive the defendant of the repose meant to be assured by the state
statute-repose that would be enjoyed by those whose prospective adversaries could not get into federal court.
5.

Summary Chart

The multifaceted nature of Erie-Hannaanalysis often leads academics to make up charts or tables in an effort to present the area to
10 5
students and others in a form that may make it easier to graspBefore the Gasperinidecision, my own effort appeared as follows:

Changes Shape, 51 V. L. REv. 884, 889 (1965): ("[U]nfair-ness... result[ing] from the
opportunity of some litigants to choose advantageously between two court systems
applying different law ...must be the sole ground of opposition to forum shopping
so long as diversity of citizenship jurisdiction remains unabridged.") (footnote omitted); cf Walker, 446 U.S. at 753 (finding reason to apply state law when inequitable
administration would result, even if fMiling to follow state law might not lead to forum
shopping).
104 19 WuGI-rr Er a.., supranote 93, § 4504, at 48 (footnote omitted); see also Ely,
supra note 29, at 717-18 (footnotes omitted):
[B]y dusting [the outcome-determination test] off and adding a couple
of qualifications that should have been there all along, [the Hanna Court]
resurrected it from the uncertain situation in which Byrd had left it. There
was nothing wrong with York but oversimplification; what was seriously wrong
was its subsequent and understandably frightening transplantation to situations involving Federal Rules and even other statutes. But in the context of
the Rules of Decision Act, a rejuvenated outcome determination test-augmented a little and clipped a little, so as to intercept the more preposterous
implications of its earlier formulations-was just what was called for.
105 For other graphics, see, for example, Floyd, supra note 8, at 283; Ides, supra
note 16, at 88.
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SUMMARY OF MODERN ER&-_-1-AAwA ANALYSIS
1) True conflict between federal and state rules?
2) If yes, then proceed from source of candidate federal rule:
Source of possible
applicable federal
rule

Approach/test to
its validity and
governing force

State law relevant?
(to federal rule's
validity)

Examples

Constitution

Governs, period

No

Byrd today? (if first
impression)

Act of Congress

If constitutional,
governs-"arguably
procedural"

No (and no
balancing)

Stewart Organization

FRCP, FRAP

Rules Enabling
Act-Hanna
holding

Yes? (issue of force
of REA subsection
(b))

Hanna, Burlington
Northern

Decisional
(purely-not
including
interpretations of
positive law)

"Twin aims" from
Hanna dictum

Yes-outcome
effect; balancing?

York, Byrd, NASCO

The chart largely summarizes the preceding discussion and does
not warrant extensive commentary. The reference to Byrd if it were to
arise as a matter of first impression today, in the position of an
example of a constitutional rule applicable in federal court, reflects
that Seventh Amendment decisions over the last four decades may
have constitutionalized the allocation to the jury of the issue in
Byrd 0 6 The question mark about the relevance of state law in REA
cases reflects uncertainty over whether the Court would be willing to
give independent force to the substantive-rights proviso in
§ 2072(b). 10 7 And the question mark with "balancing" in cases
involving federal decisional procedural law reflects the doubt about
the survival of Byrds approach' 0 8-before the Supreme Court used
Byrd in part of its analysis in Gasperini.

106 For a suggestion that Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221 (1963), by settling that the
Seventh Amendment applies fully in diversity cases made Byrd a case for decision on
constitutional grounds, see Ely, supra note 29, at 709. For more extensive discussion
of the possible constitutional grounding of Byrd, see Peter Westen & Jeffrey S.
Lehman, Is There LifeforErie After the Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REv. 311, 344-52
(1980).
107 See supra text accompanying notes 65-78.
108 See supra text accompanying notes 91-98.
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EFFECTs ON ERI--HAwA ANALYSES

Facts and Proceedings

Journalist William Gasperini lent the Center for Humanities, for
its use in making an educational videotape, 300 original color slides
he had taken in Central America. The Center made the tape and
used many of the slides, but it lost all of them. Gasperini brought a
diversity suit for damages in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York; the Center conceded liability, and the
damage issue went to a jury. Gasperini introduced testimony of an
expert that the "industry standard" per slide for a lost transparency
was $1,500. Although he had earned only about $10,000 total from
his photography in the preceding decade, the jury multiplied the fall
industry standard by the total number of lost slides and awarded Gasperini $450,000. The trial judge, without comment, denied the
Center's motion for a new trial, which included a challenge to the
verdict for excessiveness.10 9

The Second Circuit reversed, holding applicable the New York
statutory standard of review for alleged verdict excessiveness or inadequacy-whether an award "deviates materially from what would be
u 0
reasonable compensation,""
rather than the more deferential federal decisional rule allowing a verdict to stand unless it "'shocked the
conscience of the court."111 Apparently regarding itself as empowered to consider verdict-excessiveness challenges and enter conditional new-trial orders on its own, instead of remanding for trial-court
reconsideration, the court ordered a retrial unless Gasperini accepted
a remittitur reducing the award to $100,000-$1,500 per lost slide for
fifty of his photographs that may have been unique, and $100 for each
of the remaining 250.112
Gasperini sought Supreme Court review rather than accept the
remittitur, and the Court granted certiorari. 1 3 Despite the technical
nature of some of the issues, the case presented an interesting ideological twist: the position most attractive to many political conservatives and advocates of damage-limiting "tort reform" would call for full
affirmance of the Second Circuit, making the less deferential state verdict-excessiveness review standard not only applicable in federal trial

109

See Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2211, 2215-16 (1996).

110
111

N.Y. Crv. PRAC. L. & R. § 5501(c) (McKinney 1995).
Gasperini 116 S. Ct. at 2217 (quoting Consorti v. Armstrong World Indus., 72

F.3d 1003, 1012 (2d Cir. 1995), vacated and remanded, 116 S. Ct. 2576 (1996)).

112 See Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 66 F.3d 427, 428-31 (2d Cir.
1995), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 2211 (1996).
113 Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 805 (1996).
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court but its application there seemingly subject to de novo review on
appeal. Yet original-intent arguments based on the history of the Seventh Amendment's re-examination clause, which provides that "no
fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the
11 4
United States, than according to the rules of the common law,"
could readily support limiting what federal appellate courts can review
in jury cases to errors of law-thus precluding all challenges on appeal to juries' damage awards when federal trial judges left them
standing or changed them less than the appeals court might have
thought warranted.

115

In the event, only Justice Stevens, often regarded as the most "liberal" member of today's Supreme Court, supported the position most
congenial to the defense bar and voted for outright affirmance.' 16 By
contrast the Court's three staunchest "conservatives," with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joining a dissent by Justice Scalia,
took a position that would have been strikingly pro-plaintiff in its impact. They not only urged that the re-examination clause constitutionally barred any federal appellate court review of verdicts for
alleged excessiveness, but also argued that the Court's Erie-Hannajurisprudence and proper interpretation of Federal Rule 59 on new trials called for supremacy in federal court of the deferential federal
17
verdict-review standard over New York's more intensive scrutiny.'
Although the review standards apply to challenges for excessiveness
and insufficiency alike, both Gasperini'sfacts and the apparent political lineup on the issues 1 8 illustrate that the net effect of less deferential court review seems virtually certain to be many more reductions of
than increases in jury awards.
The centrist majority opinion, written by Justice Ginsburg and
joined by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer, agreed
with the Second Circuit that the state-law "deviates materially" standard applied. However, it vacated the Second Circuit's judgment for
application of the state standard by the trial court rather than on appeal, with appellate review allowed only for abuse of discretion. Because the choice of standard and the allocation of trial and appellate
responsibilities for its application in federal court involve conflict between and accommodation of state law and judge-made federal procedural law, the main effects the case may have on Erie-Hanna
114 U.S. CONsT. amend. VII.
115 See Marcia Coyle, Tort Reform Tries One More Time: Supreme Court Will Hear a
Photographer'sCase that May End Verdict Reductions, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 22, 1996, at Al.

116

See Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2225-30 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

117
118

See id. at 2230-40 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See Coyle, supra note 115; supra text accompanying notes 113-15.
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approaches seem likely to be in the category discussed in part II.B.4
above-when the source of the candidate federal rule is purely decisional law. On the choice of standard the majority routinely and unsurprisingly-at least given that it did not regard the case as involving
a standard provided by a Federal Rule"19-invoked and applied the
Hanna "twin aims" modification of York's "outcome determination"
test without mentioning Byrd.12 0 On the matter of trial-appellate allocation, in the aspect of the case that seems most to call for explanation, the Court brought Byrd into play. In two respects, however,
comments in Gasperinimay drop hints about other Erie-Hannaissues.
These warrant brief discussion before I turn to the heart of the case.
B.

Conflict Determination

The main guidance for interpreting Federal Rules to determine if
they conflict with possibly applicable state law had come from Justice
Marshall's opinion for a unanimous Court in Walker. Even though the
Court found no conflict in that case between Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 3 on an action being commenced by the filing of a complaint with the court, and state law tolling the statute of limitations
only by service of process, the opinion spoke in terms that suggested
no straining to avoid finding a conflict. That a court, in order for the
Hanna analysis to apply, must answer affirmatively the threshold
question
whether the scope of the Federal Rule in fact is sufficiently broad to

control the issue before the Court... is not to suggest that the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are to be narrowly construed in
order to avoid a "direct collision" with state law. The Federal Rules

should be given their plain meaning. If a direct collision with state
law arises from that plain meaning, then the analysis developed in
121
Hanna v. Plumerapplies.

The same no-tilt attitude appeared in Stewart Organization,the Court's
leading case involving a federal statute rather than a Federal Rule: the
119 See Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2224 n.22 (rejecting argument that FED. R. Cv. P. 59
on new trials supplies an applicable federal standard).
120 For discussion of the reasons why this use of the "twin aims" test without reference to Byrd should not have come as a surprise, see supra text accompanying notes
82-96. For a contrary view, see The Supreme Court, 1995 Term, supra note 6, at 262
(footnotes omitted):
The Gasperini Court's reliance on [the York] line of cases presents a
striking contrast to modem Erie trends. Even more surprisingly, the Court
did not use the balancing test established in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric
Cooperative,Inc., a case that involved a conflict similar to the one in Gasperini
121 Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749-50 & n.9.
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determination "whether the statute is 'sufficiently broad to control the
issue before the Court' ... involves a straightforward exercise in statutory interpretation to determine if the statute covers the point in dispute."122 Stewart Organizationitself provided strong support for the
view that the Court would read federal statutes and Rules with no deference to state law, for it interpreted § 1404(a) on federal venue
transfers broadly-perhaps questionably so123 -to

preclude giving

force in federal court to state-law hostility toward forum-selection
clauses, which likely would have meant that such clauses would not
124
have been enforced in state court.
At two separate points, however, Gasperini speaks in terms that
suggest somewhat more deferential interpretations of federal law to
avoid federal-state conflicts. Summarizing the approach for cases involving a Federal Rule, Justice Ginsburg's opinion seizes on Walkerthe Court's only case in this line since before Hannato find no "direct
collision"-as part of the basis for saying that "[f] ederal courts have
interpreted the Federal Rules . . .with sensitivity to important state

interests and regulatory policies.' 25 Later, responding to Justice
Scalia's dissenting view of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 on new
trials as supplying a "federal standard" excluding the operation of the
New York verdict-review statute, 26 the majority quotes the grand122 Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 26 (quoting Walker, 446 U.S. at 74950). Indeed, the Court went out of its way to avoid a possible misunderstanding that
might undermine the supremacy of federal law, emphasizing that its reference to a
"direct collision" was "not meant to mandate that federal law and state law be perfectly coextensive and equally applicable to the issue at hand.... It would make no
sense for the supremacy of federal law to wane precisely because there is no state law
directly on point." Id. at 26-27 n.4.
123 See id. at 34-38 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Freer, supra note 3.
124 See Stewart Org., 487 U.S. at 28-32; see also supranote 23 and accompanying text
(showing "direct collision" found in all of Supreme Court's federal statute and Rule
cases in Eri-Hannaline except Walker).
125 Gasperini,116 S.Ct. at 2219 n.7. The Court also cites S.A. Healy Co. v. Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District., 60 F.3d 305, 310-12 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S.
1010 (1995), in which the Seventh Circuit found no conflict between Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 68 on offers ofjudgment by defendants and a state provision for formal
settlement offers by plaintiffs, permitting application of the state rule.
126 See Gasperini, 116 S.Ct. at 2239 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
The recent Cornell Law Review Note argues that in this aspect of the case the
Gasperini majority may have gravely undermined Hanna's holding about the governing force of an on-point Federal Rule. See King, supra note 12, at 188-89. The
Note suggests that the Court may have "purposefully allowed state law to define the
content," id. at 188, of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 on new trials, and that this
approach could apply to "many other Federal Rules," making them "when not explicit ...mere empty containers waiting to be filled in by state procedural rules." Id.
at 189.
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daddy of federal courts casebooks for the proposition, dubious in light
of the dominant tendency in the Court's decisions from Hanna onward, that the Court had "'continued since [Hanna] . . .to interpret

the federal rules to avoid conflict with important state regulatory policies."'1

27

The Gasperini Court's shift of emphasis-which should not

be overread because the majority did not disavow the earlier statements about "plain meaning" and "straightforward... statutory interpretation"-takes on some special significance because it came in an
opinion not joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and
Thomas, the three members of today's Supreme Court generally most
inclined to favor the states on federalism issues. Their pro-federal
view in Gasperini'ssomewhat unusual situation, involving cross-cutting
arguments over fidelity to historical views of the Seventh AmendAs stated, the Note's point seems overdrawn and unlikely to command acceptance in the Supreme Court or the lower federal courts. First, the Gasperinimajority
almost certainly did not intend such far-reaching consequences. Second, the Note
proceeds from the premise thatJustice Scalia's view of Rule 59-rejected by the majority, see Gasperini,116 S.Ct. at 2224 n.22-is correct. See King, supranote 12, at 188
(footnote omitted) ("As Justice Scalia pointed out in dissent, '[Rule 59 (a)'s authorization for new trials injury-tried cases "for any of the reasons for which new trials have
heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States"] is undeniably a federal standard'"). While the majority's view of Rule 59 as not supplying a
federal standard is contestable, not only did it rejectJustice Scalia's reading; it made
clear by using the Hanna dictum's "twin aims" approach that it viewed the case as
involving not the interpretation of a Federal Rule, but choice between state law and a
federal rule that the majority saw as purely judge-made.
The core of truth in the Note's point seems to rest on the fact that the Court will
look, and so should lower federal courts, to state law deserving to be regarded as
"substantive" when necessary to apply a federal procedural rule. In a state law case a
federal court looks to state substantive law to determine whether allegations fail "to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted" in dealing with a motion to dismiss
under Federal Rule 12(b) (6), and what facts are "material" on a Rule 56 summary
judgment motion. The question raised by Gasperiniis whether the Court has carried
that conceptually unproblematic practice troublingly far into one borderline area,
with implications for others, by declining to regard Rule 59(a) as providing generally
applicable content for federal court rulings on motions for new trials claiming excessiveness or insufficiency of a jury's damage award. Given the generality of Rule
59(a)'s language, the specificity of the Gasperinimajority's focus on what it regarded
as the substantive nature of the New York "deviates materiality" standard, and the
lower federal courts' treatment of Gasperinithus far, see infra note 157 and infra text
accompanying notes 156-57, I do not yet see serious ground for concern about problematically broad readings of Gasperini by the courts (as opposed to the academic
commentators). But confident prophecy would be rash.
127 Gasperini, 116 S.Ct. at 2224 n.22 (opinion of the Court) (quoting RICHARD H.
FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYS.
TEM 729-30 (4th ed. 1996)) (footnote omitted).
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ment, 128 probably does not signal any disinclination to join future
readings of federal statutes and Rules that show some deference to
state concerns in the interest of avoiding a "direct collision."
C. The Substantive-Rights Limitation
As part of its response to justice Scalia's broad reading of Rule 59,
the majority briefly mentioned § 2072(b)'s ban on affecting substantive rights. 129 In context, the Court seemed to be hinting that construing Rule 59 in such a way as to trump the state verdict-excessiveness
standard just might raise a problem under the REA- 130 I would claim
no more, and the majority avoided any federal-state clash problem
here by rejecting Justice Scalia's view that Rule 59 itself provided a
"federal standard."1 3 1 The reference reads much like the passing acknowledgments of the substantive-rights proviso seen in previous
opinions, 132 but the Court's use of § 2072 (b) gives some tentative support to the view that it might be willing in an appropriate, albeit unusual, case to read real teeth into that part of the statute. For reasons I
should not belabor, 33 I hope so.

128 Compare Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2231 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The practice of
federal appellate reexamination of facts found by a jury is precisely what the People of
the several States considered not to be good legal policy in 1791."), with id. at 2224
n.20 (opinion of the Court by Ginsburg, J.) ("If the meaning of the Seventh Amendment were fixed at 1791, our civil juries would remain, as they unquestionably were at
common law, 'twelve good men and true.'" (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLtACSToNE, COMMENTARIES *349)). See generally Coyle, supra note 115 (discussing policy and constitutional-history issues in Gasperini in an article published to coincide with the case's
argument before the Supreme Court).
129 See Gasperini, 116 S. Ct.. at 2224 n.22 (opinion of the Court) (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072(a)-(b) (1994)).
130 See Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2224 n.22 (quoting dissenting opinion of ScaliaJ.,
on Federal Rule 59's providing a "federal standard" in "direct collision" with New
York's verdict-review standard and "leaving no room for the operation of" the state
standard, id. at 2239-40 (Scalia, J. dissenting)). The Gasperini Court continued:
"Whether damages are excessive for the claim-in-suit must be governed by some law.
And there is no candidate for that governance other than the law that gives rise to the
claim for relief-here, the law of New York." Id. at 2224 n.22. The majority then
cited and quoted the procedural-rules authorization of § 2072 (a) and the substantiverights limitation of § 2072(b). Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2224 n.22.
131 Compare id. at 2224 n.22 with id. at 2239-40 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
132 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
133 See supra text accompanying notes 72-78 (discussing the desirability of giving
independent force to 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)'s substantive-rights restriction).
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GeneralAnalysis for Cases Involving DecisionalFederalRules

After sketching the New York "deviates materially" standard's
background "as part of a series of tort reform measures" 134 meant to
replace the "insufficient check on damage awards"' 3 5 afforded by the
"shock the conscience" test previously applied in both New York state
and federal courts, the majority noted the state standard's effect "in
design and operation [of] influenc[ing] outcomes by tightening the
range of tolerable awards."' 3 6 It acknowledged that the state statute
was "both 'substantive' and 'procedural' ",l37 for purposes of the general Erie-Hannaguideline that "federal courts sitting in diversity apply
state substantive law and federal procedural law,"' 38 framing the "dispositive question" as "whether federal courts can give effect to the substantive thrust of § 5501 (c) without untoward alteration of the federal
scheme for the trial and decision of civil cases. "1 9 To answer at least
part of that question, the Court moved in segment JII.A of its opinion
to the point of departure that its every utterance on the subject starting with Hanna should have led one to expect in a case involving a
federal decisional rule-Hanna's"twin aims" modification of the York
"outcome-determination" test. 140
The majority's application of the test was straightforward and
fairly brief, reaching a result that seems sensible. It analogized the
verdict-excessiveness review standard to a statutory cap on damages,
which petitioner Gasperini conceded "would supply substantive law
for Erie purposes."' 41 Although the state statute "contains a procedural instruction" directing the state appellate courts to apply the
"deviates materially" standard, "the State's objective is manifestly substantive"; the statute "differs from a statutory cap principally 'in that
the maximum amount recoverable is not set by statute, but rather is
134 Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2217.
135 Id. at 2218.
136 Id. at 2218-19.
137 Id. at 2219.
138 IM
139 Id.
140 The post-York "pathmarking case" of Hanna, "qualifying" York,
explained that the "outcome-determination" test must not be applied
mechanically to sweep in all manner of variations [between state and federal
rules]; instead, its application must be guided by "the twin aims of the Eie

rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws."
Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2220 (quoting Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468).
141

Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2220 (citing Reply Brief for Petitioner at 2, Gasperini

(No. 95-719) and Transcript of Oral Argument at 4-5, 25, Gasperini(No. 95-719)).
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Federal-court adherence to the "shocks

the conscience" test would leave standing some excessively large (and
small) verdicts on state-law claims that would not survive post-trial review in New York's courts under the state's "deviates materially" standard, which the majority plausibly found to implicate Erie's "twin
aims.

'143

Nonobservance of the state standard in federal court would

both undercut the state's effort to control something that is very much
a matter of state substantive law, the amounts of compensatory damages recoverable on state-law claims, and would discriminate against
(usually) defendants whose adversaries could choose the federal forum-not to mention giving parties an incentive to try getting into
federal court precisely to get a potential advantage if they wanted to
seek in advance some protection for a potentially variant damage
award.
More interesting than the particulars of the decision is the import
of the Court's approach in this part of the opinion for Erie-Hannadoctrine. First, even though the Court goes on to make some use of Byrd
for the first time in almost two decades, it is significant that the discussion in part III.A on the choice of review standard relies entirely on
the Hanna "twin aims" rendition of Erie and York and-like every
other Supreme Court invocation of the "twin aims" test' 4 -- conspicuously omits Byrd.14 5 In short, Hanna's "twin aims" formulation remains the general and dominant starting point for Erie cases involving
judge-made federal law. The majority's approach here is not, as the
district court characterized it after remand, "likely a reversion by the
Supreme Court to prior Erie doctrine since abandoned, of which
[York] is the outstanding example"; 14 6 it instead confirms everything
the Court had said on the point since it modified the York "outcome
determination" test in Hanna.
Second, the majority's exclusive reliance on the Hannarendition
of York in part III.A shows that despite its later invocation of Byrd, use
of that case's multi-factor balancing approach is to be confined to

142 Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2220 (quoting Brief for City of New York as Amicus
Curiae at 11, Gasperini (No. 95-719)).
143 Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2221.

144 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
145
146

See Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2219-21.
Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 765, 767 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)

(citation omitted). For a similar (mis) characterization of Gasperin'suse of the "twin
aims" approach, see Floyd, supra note 8, at 292: "IT]he majority reverted to the
unadorned 'outcome determination' test of York. .. "
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some subset of this one category of the Erie-Hannaarea.147 The GasperiniCourt does unhelpfully little to define just what that subset is, an
effort saved here until after a sketch of the role Byrd plays in later
parts of the Court's opinion. 148 This seeming limit on the scope of
Byrd's applicability is all the more apparent because Byrd balancing
would have been easy enough to apply in Gasperiniand would have
pointed toward the majority's result 149 the New York rule does seem
"bound up with" state substantive law, federal interests in the verdict15 0
excessiveness review standard applied on a state claim are limited,
and the likelihood of an influence on outcomes-here, amounts ulti147 By speaking of the limited applicability of the Byrd balancing approach, I do
not mean to exclude the possibility of using the single Byrd factor of the relation
between a state procedural rule and state substantive lights as an aid in applying the
Hanna "twin aims" approach. Asking whether a state rule with a procedural cast is
"intended to be bound up with the definition of the rights and obligations of the
parties," Byrd, 356 U.S. at 536, can be one sensible way of trying to figure out whether
a state rule also has enough of a substantive nature that it would threaten "inequitable
administration of the laws," Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468 (footnote omitted), were a federal
court not to follow it. See, e.g., Trierweiler v. Croxton & Trench Holding Corp., 90
F.3d 1523, 1541 (10th Cir. 1996) ("[T]he Colorado certificate of review statute
manifests 'a substantive decision by that State,'" and "is 'bound up' with the substantive right embodied in the state cause of action for professional negligence, and
therefore it should apply to professional negligence actions brought in federal court
under diversity jurisdiction" (quoting Walker, 446 U.S. at 751 (footnote omitted));
Herbert v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 911 F.2d 1044, 1047-48 (5th Cir. 1990) ("With respect to Erie's second aim, the [state uncalled-witness] rule is not 'bound up with the
definition of the rights and obligations of the parties' under state law so that denying
the inference [that testimony of the uncalled witness would have been adverse] would
result in different treatment between those parties suing in state court and those suing in federal court on the same cause of action" (quoting Byrd, 356 U.S. at 536)
(footnotes omitted)).
148 See infra text accompanying notes 178-200.
149 See The Supreme Court, 1995 Term, supranote 6, at 265 ("[T]he Court could have
justified the application of the state statute under the Byrd balancing test" by finding
"the state interest to outweigh the federal interest.").
150 When a federal court reviews ajury award for excessiveness or inadequacy by a
more intrusive state standard rather than by a less rigorous federal one, that does
"affect the judge-jury relationship in the federal courts." Byrd, 356 U.S. at 538. But
performing under a less deferential standard a review function that the court can
perform in any jury-tried damages case disrupts that relationship much less than keeping a potentially dispositive defense from the jury and leaving it to the judge, which
was the issue in Byrd.
The GasperiniCourt speaks early in part III.B of its opinion, once it has resolved
the choice of standard in favor of the state rule and moved on to the trial-appeal
allocation of responsibility for the standard's application, of Byrds having said that
the "'outcome-determination' test was an insufficient guide in cases presenting countervailing federal interests." Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2222. The implication seems
strong that the Court saw no federal interest sufficient to invoke Byrd in the content of
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mately recovered rather than victory or defeat-is significant.1 51 Instead, by precept and example, the Court before and in Gasperinihas
continued to send to the lower federal courts and lawyers practicing
there, and to civil procedure professors and their students, the
message still surprisingly often ignored that the place to start in a federal decisional-law case is with the Hanna "twin aims" formulation,
52
and not with Byrds balancing approach.
Third, thus far the lower federal courts seem to have had relatively little trouble with this aspect of Gasperini. For the most part they
have straightforwardly applied its apparent prescription of following
state verdict-excessiveness standards (at least to the extent they warrant characterization as substantive),153 with just the occasional overthe standard itself in this case, as opposed to the allocation of responsibility for its
application within the federal judicial structure.
151 See supra note 57 (summarizing Byrd factors).
152 Despite its revival of Byrd later in the opinion, the majority in Gasperini does
seem to be limiting its possible applicability only to a subset of the federal-decisionallaw area generally governed by Hanna's "twin aims" dictum, leaving no opening for
Byrd to apply when the candidate federal rule is positive law such as a Federal Rule of
Civil or Appellate Procedure. After granting that "[c] lassification of a law as 'substantive' or 'procedural' for Eriepurposes is sometimes a challenging endeavor," Gasperini,
116 S. Ct. at 2219 (footnote omitted), and just before it introduces the "outcome
determination" test with its "twin aims" modification, the Court drops a footnote
about Federal Rule cases that speaks in terms seemingly excluding any possibility of
Byrd balancing:
Concerning matters covered by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the ["substance-procedure"] characterization is usually unproblematic: It is
settled that if the Rule in point is consonant with the Rules Enabling Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2072, and the Constitution, the Federal Rule applies regardless of
contrary state law.
Gasperini,116 S. Ct. at 2220 n.7 (emphasis added) (citing holding portion of Hanna,
380 U.S. at 469-74, and BurlingtonNorthern, 480 U.S. at 4-5); see also supra notes 57, 61
and text accompanying notes 57-61 (discussing exclusion of Byrd balancing from
Rules Enabling Act analysis).
153 See, e.g., Steinke v. Beach Bungee, Inc., 105 F.3d 192, 197 (4th Cir. 1997) ("The
Supreme Court's mandate requires the district court to apply the substantive component of a state's law concerning the excessiveness of a verdict."). Professor Floyd
raises the fair question whether Gasperinishould be read as prescribing general applicability of state verdict-excessiveness standards on state claims in federal court or
whether there should be case-by-case "inquiry into the substantive underpinnings of
those rules." Floyd, supra note 8, at 304 (footnote omitted). Compare Gasperini,116 S.
Ct. at 2217-21 (considering substantive underpinnings and aim of the New York standard), with id. at 2221 ("Erie precludes a recovery in federal court significantly larger
than the recovery that would have been tolerated in state court."). Although it may
be unlikely that a state verdict-excessiveness standard, especially one more intrusive
than the federal decisional "shocks the conscience" test, will lack any substantive purpose, Professor Floyd's query can serve as a reminder to counsel and judges-espe-
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or apparent misunderstanding of

And if they are reflexively extending Gasperinibeyond

applying state-law standards for verdict excessiveness or insufficiency
on state-law claims, to such kindred but distinguishable points as the
sufficiency of the evidence to go to the jury on a state-law claim in
federal court in the first place-an issue on which the federal courts
have been for some time and may remain divided156-I have not
found such cases, and I have looked at every decision through midApril 1998 that shows up under Gasperiniin Westlaw's KeyCite service. 157 Gasperines implications for such issues may be more limited
dally in light of the Supreme Court's focus on the "manifestly substantive" nature of
"the State's objective" underlying the standard, id. at 2225-to consider whether the
Court has prescribed a blanket outcome or a rule-by-rule inquiry.
154 See Miksis v. Howard, 106 F.3d 754, 764 (7th Cir. 1997) ("We use federal standards to determine excessiveness of verdicts in diversity cases."). But seeTo-Am Equip.
Co. v. Mitsubishi Caterpillar Forklift Am., Inc., 953 F. Supp. 987, 995 (N.D. Inl. 1997)
(stating that on verdict-amount review, "Illinois law supplies the substantive standard"). The Seventh Circuit panel in Miksis did not cite Gasperiniand may not have
been aware of it; instead, it relied on a pre-GasperiniSeventh Circuit decision, Mayerv.
Gary Parnenu & Co., 29 F.3d 330 (7th Cir. 1994), which dealt with several points including summary judgment standards, appellate review, sufficiency of the evidence,
verdict excessiveness, and availability of remittitur or additur. On all these issues, the
court in Mayerheld for the dominance of federal rules, a position that may survive in
all respects-except the one, verdict excessiveness, on which the Miksis court followed
Mayer. The district court in To-Am, by contrast, apprehended the import of Gasperini
quite acutely, following the statement quoted above with a citation inviting the reader
to compare Gasperiniwith Mayer.
155 See Torres v. Wendco, No. 95-1544, 1997 WL 135682, at *4 (D.P.R. Jan. 15,
1997) ("In the absence of a state statute governing awards that 'materially deviate'
from awards in similar cases, Puerto Rico and other states in the First Circuit have no
substantive state laws governing limitations in [sic] jury awards. I therefore turn to
federal case law for guidance."). Although the heritage of Puerto Rico as a codebased, civil-law jurisdiction may underlie this disregard of possibly relevant common
law from the Puerto Rico courts, the decision seems to make the error of treating the
source of state, territorial, or commonwealth law as relevant for Erie-Hannapurposes.
See supra note 76 (source of state, as opposed to federal, law is immaterial for ErieHanna analysis). For a decision rejecting Torres and following state common law standards, see Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Ina, 984 F. Supp. 923, 933 (M.D.N.C.
1997).
156 See generally Steven Alan Childress, JudicialReview and DiversityJurisdiction:Solving an IrrepressibleErie Mystery 2, 47 SMU L. Rnv. 271 (1994) (discussing federal court
approaches to several types of decisions including review of summary judgments, new
trial rulings, remittitur orders, and sufficiency-of-the-evidence determinations).
157 The CornellNote asserts that "[i]n the wake of Gasperini, the federal courts have
largely found that district courts must apply the state sufficiency of the evidence standard without engaging in an Erie analysis." King, supra note 12, at 190 n.193. This
reading of the cases seems unnecessarily to assume that whatever goes for the choice
of federal or state standard on verdict excessiveness or inadequacy must also go for
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than one might initially think, because Gasperini involved application
of the long-established "twin aims" approach to a situation involving
pretty clearly substantive state concerns, which may not be present in
related but distinct contexts-and those settings may also involve a
Federal Rule, triggering a different analysis. If they do not, then they
may involve countervailing federal interests, which means they are
best saved until after consideration of the import of Byrd's limited revival in Gasperini, to which I now turn.
E.

Byrd Redux: How Do You Know an "EssentialCharacteristic"of the
Federal Court System or a "CountervailingFederal Interest"
Wen You See One?

Having dealt on conventional Hanna "twin aims" grounds with
the choice between state and federal standards, the Court in parts
III.B and III.C of its Gasperini opinion turned to the allocation of authority between federal trial and appellate courts for administering
the state standard-and made its first substantial use of Byrd since
before Hanna. The New York statute setting the "deviates materially"
standard speaks by its terms to the state's intermediate appellate
courts rather than to trial courts, 158 although state-court construction
of the law had read it as instructing trial judges also. 159 Yet direct
the standard on sufficiency of the evidence-which usually refers to the input ruling
on what suffices as a matter of law for a case to go to the jury, not the output decision
on whether the jury award was excessive or inadequate. As to the latter, as Gasperini
reflects, the purposes underlying state standards may be strongly substantive. The

three cases the Note cites for its assertion all deal only with the narrow and distinguishable question of the source of a verdict-excessiveness standard, not broader newtrial or sufficiency-of-the-evidence issues generally. See Steinke, 105 F.3d at 197 ("The
Supreme Court's mandate [in Gasperinfl requires the district court to apply the substantive component of a state's law concerning the excessiveness of a verdict."); Pescatore v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 97 F.3d 1, 18 (2d Cir. 1996) ("Because we are
holding today that the federal rule for determining damages in this case is furnished
by Ohio law, the federal rule for excessiveness should also be furnished by Ohio
law."); Imbrogno v. Chamberlin, 89 F.3d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1996) ("[Tlhe trial court
should have.., looked to Connecticut substantive law to determine whether the jury
award was excessive ....

158

").

N.Y. Clv. PPAc. L. & R. § 5501(c) (McKinney 1995):
In reviewing a moneyjudgment in an action... in which it is contended
that the award is excessive or inadequate and that a new trial should have
been granted unless a stipulation is entered to a different award, the appellate division shall determine that an award is excessive or inadequate if it
deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation.
159 See Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2211, 2218 (1996) (citing New York Appellate Division cases dealing with application of the "deviates materially" standard in state trial courts).
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application of, or de novo review under, the state standard by federal
appellate courts in accord with the state statute might run afoul of the
Seventh Amendment's re-examination clause. 160 The majority
avoided this problem by what it viewed as an accommodation of state
and federal interests within constitutional bounds, with federal trial
courts applying the state verdict-excessiveness standard, but that application being subject to appellate review only under the deferential
161
abuse-of-discretion criterion.
Part of the Court's route to this conclusion involves its rejection
of the constitutional argument that the re-examination clause bans
federal appellate review of trial-court denials of motions to set aside
verdicts as excessive, 162 a topic that is outside the scope of this essay on
the modem contours of the Erie-Hannadoctrine. 163 Before and after
160 See supratext accompanying note 117. Indeed,Justice Scalia dissented in considerable part on the ground that the re-examination clause barred all federal appellate review, including for verdict excessiveness, of facts found by a federal jury.
Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2230-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Under this view, court review
of juries' fact findings could take place only at the trial level, with trial judges' decisions not subject to appellate scrutiny even for abuse of discretion.
161 See Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2224-25. Professor Floyd's criticism of Gasperini
reads at times as if it may fuse two distinct questions with which the Court dealt-the
standard of scrutiny applicable when federal courts review jury verdicts on New York
state-law claims for alleged excessiveness or inadequacy, and the standard of appellate
review when a federal court of appeals considers a challenge to a federal district
judge's application of the state "deviates materially" standard. Floyd, supra note 8, at
293-94 (The "[ Gasperinil] Court held that the federal 'abuse of discretion' standard of
review rather than the state's more intrusive 'materially deviates' standard, must control.") (footnote omitted). The federal system may depart from the manner in which
the state allocates judicial responsibility for applying the "deviates materially" guideline while still adhering to its applicability; the court of appeals is to assure that the
district court did apply the state standard, and to review the trial court's action for
abuse of discretion in applying that standard. Thus Gasperinidid not "conclude that
the New York standard of appellate review was inapplicable in a diversity action in
which New York substantive law applied," id. at 268, unless applying "deviates materially" at the trial level in federal court does not count at all.
162 See Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2223-24.
163 I cannot resist, though, noting one heavy hint that the majority drops, in the
course of its Seventh Amendment discussion, about the possible constitutionality of
additur in federal court. Under Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486-88 (1935), remittitur-judicial denial of a defendant's new-trial motion for verdict excessiveness, conditioned on plaintiff s acceptance of a reduction in the jury's award-is constitutional
under the Seventh Amendment, but the converse practice of additur to increase inadequate verdicts is not. The distinction has been heavily criticized. See, e.g., Irene
Deaville Sann, Remittiturs (and Additurs) in the Federal Courts: An Evaluation with Suggested Alternatives, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 157, 175 (1988) ("A distinction between
remittitur and additur on grounds that a remittitur-reduced verdict is included in the
jury verdict while an additur-increased verdict is not so included is specious.").
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her treatment of this issue, Justice Ginsburg invokes Byrd-first to
identify the trial-appellate "allocation of authority to review verdicts"1 64 as "'[a]n essential characteristic of [the federal-court] system" '165 and to say that "outcome determination" analysis is "an
insufficient guide in cases presenting countervailing federal interests"; 166 then to state that the "one-or-the-other" federal-state choice
required in Byrd need not be made here, "for the principal state and
federal interests can be accommodated" 67 by the combination of
trial-court application of the state standard and appellate review for
abuse of discretion. Thus the involvement of an "essential characteristic," or-what appears to be the same thing-a "countervailing federal interest" in the application of a federal decisional rule, can call
for using something other than or in addition to the usual "twin aims"
In language that implies a suggestion to counsel to raise the constitutionality of
additur for reconsideration, the Gasperinicourt notes the prestigious dissenters who
fell one vote short of a majority in Dimick
Inviting rethinking of the additur question on a later day, Justice Stone,
joined by Chief Justice Hughes, and Justices Brandeis and Cardozo, found
nothing in the history or language of the Seventh Amendment forcing the
"incongruous position" that "afederal trial court may deny a motion for a
new trial where the plaintiff consents to decrease the judgment to a proper
amount," but may not condition denial of the motion on "the defendant's
consent to a comparable increase in the recovery."
Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2222 n.16 (quoting Dimick, 293 U.S. at 495 (Stone, J.,
dissenting)).
The Court's recent directions to lower courts, however, make it clear that they
are not to anticipate any possible overruling in their own decisions.
We reaffirm that "if a precedent of this Court has direct application in a
case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions,
the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving
to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions."
Agostini v. Felton, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 2017 (1997) (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989)). Lower federal courts since
Gasperini have heeded this instruction, rejecting additur requests on the authority of
Dimick. See Maier v. Lucent Techs., 120 F.3d 730, 737 (7th Cir. 1997); Douglas v.
DynMcDermott Petroleum Operations Co., No. 95-1967, 1996 WL 560018, at *1 (E.D.
La. Oct. 1, 1996). Plaintiffs counsel with a large enough stake, though, should continue to seek additur in lower federal courts to preserve the issue for Supreme Court
review. "Adherence to... [the] teaching [of not anticipating overruling of Supreme
Court precedents] by the District Court and the Court of Appeals ...does not insulate a legal principle on which they relied from our review to determine its continued
vitality." Agostini, 117 S.Ct. at 2017.
164 Gasperini, 116 S.Ct. at 2222.
165 Id. at 2221 (quoting Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537).
166 Gasperini, 116 S.Ct. at 2222.
167 Id. at 2224.
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approach for cases involving such rules.1 68 But it need not lead to the
balancing employed in Byrd itself as a basis for choosing between state
and federal rules, if the court can find some means of accommodating
the interests underpinning both rules.
The Court's discussion in these parts of its opinion is cryptic or
unclear in two important respects: first, concerning what might constitute an "essential characteristic" or "countervailing federal interest"
sufficient to call for going beyond the Hanna"twin aims" analysis and
to invoke Byrd-Gasperinibalancing or accommodation, and second,
about whether the trial-appellate allocation of responsibility required
by Gasperiniis constitutionally mandated or rather a matter of federal
decisional law arrived at under at most some perceived influence from
the Seventh Amendment. The second of these points is largely a question of Seventh Amendment interpretation with no direct bearing on
general Erie-Hannaanalyses, and warrants only brief discussion here.
Byrd had made it clear that the federal rule in question in that case,
assigning a particular decision to a federal courtjury rather to the trial
judge, was a decisional one based on "strong federal policy,"1 69 and
that while the Seventh Amendment exercised "influence" 170 on that
7
allocation the Court was not reaching any constitutional question.' '
By contrast, Gasperinispeaks at one point as if it is reaching the
Seventh Amendment issue and finding it dispositive: "The Seventh
Amendment... controls the allocation of authority to review verdicts,
168 Whenever Byrd may provide the appropriate method of analysis, "outcome determination" considerations do not become irrelevant. The third type of factor
weighed in the Byrd Court's balance, after examination of the state and federal interests involved, was the likelihood of an outcome-affecting impact resulting from the
choice between the state and federal rules. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 539-40 (discussing reasons why rule choice might not lead to different results and concluding that "[w] e do
not think the likelihood of a different result is so strong as to require the federal
practice ofjury determination of disputed factual issues to yield to the state rule in
the interest of uniformity of outcome") (footnote omitted). It is only logical that
"outcome determination" analysis should remain a factor; Byrd, like Hanna, tries to
implement Erie, and Hanna identified the forum-shopping and inequitable-administration concerns that guide application of the "outcome determination" test as "the
twin aims of the Erie rule." Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468.

169
170
171

Byrd, 356 U.S. at 538.
Id- at 537.
Id. at 537 n.10:
Our conclusion makes unnecessary the consideration of-and we intimate no view upon-the constitutional question whether the right of jury
trial protected in federal courts by the Seventh Amendment embraces the
factual issue of statutory immunity [from suit in tort because of workers'
compensation coverage] when asserted, as here, as an affirmative defense in
a common-law negligence action.
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the issue of concern here."' 72 If that is so, all that is necessary is to
interpret and apply the amendment, without mentioning Byrd or engaging in balancing or accommodation. Yet the opinion goes on to
speak of still respecting "New York's dominant interest... without
disrupting the federal system"' 7 3 and then of "practical reasons combin [ing] with Seventh Amendment constraints to lodge in the district
court, not the court of appeals, primary responsibility" 174 for applying
the state standard. One cannot be sure, but in context the best guess
may be that the majority might regard anything more than appellate
review for abuse of trial court discretion as a violation of the re-examination clause, 75 while at least that much review is constitutionally per-

172 Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2222 (emphasis added).
173 Id. at 2224.
174 Id. at 2225.
175 The Court does not, however, specify exactly what any "Seventh Amendment
constraints" are, while it does spell out "practical reasons" for the federal trial-appellate allocation of responsibility:
Trial judges have the "unique opportunity to consider the evidence in
the living courtroom context" [quoting Taylor v. Washington Terminal Co.,
409 F.2d 145, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1969)], while appellate judges see only the "cold
paper record." [quoting Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 66 F.3d
427, 431 (2d Cir. 1995), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 2211 (1996)].
... "If we reverse, it must be because of an abuse of discretion.... The
very nature of the problem counsels restraint.... We must give the benefit
of every doubt to the judgment of the trial judge." (quoting Dagnello v.
Long Island R.R., 289 F.2d 797, 806 (2d Cir. 1961)).
Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2225. The lack of specificity about Seventh Amendment constraints leaves room for a later Court to treat Gasperinias having reserved decision on
constitutional issues aside from the permissibility of abuse-of-discretion appellate review, although the practical reasons could continue to make it unnecessary to reach
other Seventh Amendment questions. One other phrasing that may suggest avoidance of most constitutional decisions in Gasperiniis the reference early in the opinion
to "the federal system's division of trial and appellate court functions [as] an allocation weighted by the Seventh Amendment," id. at 2219 (emphasis added)-which
sounds rather like Byrds reference to the Amendment's "influence" along with its
dodge of deciding whether the Amendment in the circumstance before the Court
issued a "command." See Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537 ("An essential characteristic of [the
federal judicial] system is the manner in which, in civil common-law actions, it distributes trial functions between judge and jury and, under the influence-if not the command-of the Seventh Amendment, assigns the decisions of disputed questions of
fact to the jury.") (footnote omitted); supra note 171 and text accompanying notes
169-71; see also King, supranote 12, at 185 ("The GasperiniCourt never stated that the
Seventh Amendment required the deferential abuse of discretion review; instead, the
Seventh Amendment's influence leads to the conclusion that the deferential federal
standard should apply.").
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mitted 176 and is desirable as a practical and policy matter 177 (like the
judgejury allocation as the Court viewed it in Byrd) but not constitutionally required. The later discussion therefore can be taken as qualifying the sweeping statement about Seventh Amendment "control" to
make that control at most partial, leaving room for some accommodation of state interests.
More consequential for where Erie-Hanna analyses stand after
Gasperiniis the unanswered question of what can constitute an "essential characteristic" of the federal judicial system or a "countervailing
federal interest" in a judge-made federal procedural rule, calling for
consideration of state and federal interests as well as likely outcome
effects and leading to balancing or accommodation. Justice Ginsburg's invocation of Byrd as a deus ex machina, with virtually no explanation of the occasions for or limits on its use, may be understandable
as a matter of strongly case-focused judicial method. 178 Yet much as I
may disagree with Professor Floyd when he asserts that "[t]he Gasperini majority relied centrally on Byrd"' 7 9-for the Court does not engage in Byrd-style balancing to decide on the allocation of trial- and
appellate-level responsibilities, and Byrd plays no role in the choice of
standard for verdict-excessiveness review-the opinion largely earns
his criticism that "Byrd still lives, but we know not why, or to what
extent." 8 0 About all we get from the Gasperini opinion is the apparent direction not to rely solely on "outcome determination" analysis in
See Gasperin4 116 S. Ct. at 2224 ("We now . . . make explicit [that]
'[N] othing in the Seventh Amendment... precludes appellate review of the trial
judge's denial of a motion to set aside [a jury verdict] as excessive.'" (quoting
Grunenthal v. Long Island R.R., 393 U.S. 156, 164 (1968) (Stewart, J., dissenting))
(footnote omitted).
177 See Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2223 ("[A]ppellate review for abuse of discretion is
reconcilable with the Seventh Amendment as a control necessary and proper to the
fair administration ofjustice.").
178 SeeJeffrey Rosen, The New Look of Liberalism on the Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5,
1997, § 6 (Magazine), at 60. Rosen describes Justice Ginsburg's judicial approaches
with phrases like the following: "an affinity for resolving cases on narrow procedural
grounds," id. at 62; one decision, "[1)ike all of Ginsburg's opinions.... resolves the
question before the Court, while studiously refusing to speculate about other cases in
the future," id. at 65; "Ginsburg'sjurisprudence... is more concerned about case-bycase particularism than philosophical consistency," id.; "deciding only the case before
her, and delaying related questions until they are ripe for decision," id. at 90.
179 Floyd, supra note 8, at 270.
180 Id. at 305; see also id. at 297:
Gasperiniprovided the Court with a much needed opportunity... to
reconcile its disparate approaches in Hanna and Byrd, and to explain, confine, or reject Byrd's balancing approach in light of the uncertainties and
criticism that it has spawned. Instead, the Court confounded the confusion
176

...
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decisional-federal-law "cases presenting countervailing federal interests," 18' whatever those may be. We know from the examples of Byrd
itself, of the Court's last pre-Gasperiniinvocation of Byrd in Donovan v.
Penn Shipping Co., 1 8 2 and of Gasperinithat "essential characteristics" in-

volving such interests are present in the Seventh Amendmentshadowed area of allocation of decisionmaking authority among federal juries, trial judges, and appellate courts.
Beyond that (if there is a beyond, which there may not and perhaps should not be), we are left to our collective wits. When that is
how we find ourselves, let us hope that resignation and despair need
not be our only reactions. We can deduce first that the only relevant
types of federal system characteristics or interests are those of a procedural nature such as to have led to a decisional rule, not dictated by
constitutional interpretation or embodied in an Act of Congress or a
Federal Rule promulgated under the REA. The federal interests for
present purposes cannot be substantive, for Erie settled that making
general common law is not the federal courts' business.188 As Profesby its studied indifference to the real issues presented by its invocation of
Byrd
181 Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2222.
182 429 U.S. 648, 649 (1977) (per curiam) ("The proper role of the trial and appellate courts in the federal system in reviewing the size ofjury verdicts is... a matter
of federal law." (citing Hanna, 380 U.S. at 466-69, and Byrd 356 U.S. 525). Donovan
reaffirmed "the longstanding rule that a plaintiff in federal court, whether prosecuting a state or federal cause of action, may not appeal from a remittitur order he has
accepted." Donovan, 429 U.S. at 650. Its citation to Hanna is to the dictum portion of
the Hanna opinion, which includes both its citation to Byrd in support of the statement that "'[o]utcome-determination' analysis was never intended to serve as a talisman," Hanna, 380 U.S. at 466-67, and the "twin aims" recasting of the "outcome
determination" test, id. at 468 & n.9. Gasperini relied on Donovan, quoting the sentence above about the "proper role of the [federal] trial and appellate courts," Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2224, but in light of Gasperin's choice of the state verdictexcessiveness standard, the reference to federal courts' "role" in Donovan seems to
have to be read as referring to such matters as the allocation of federal trial and
appellate courts' responsibilities vis-A-vis each other, and not necessarily to the standards they apply.
183 "There is no federal general common law." Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. The making of
specialized federal substantive common law in areas of particular federal interest or
unique federal competence, such as foreign relations, disputes between states, and
federal proprietary interests, see generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKy, FEDERAL JURISDICTION
§ 6.1-.3.2 (2d ed. 1994), can raise federal-state issues somewhat kindred to those that
arise when state law with substantive overtones and judge-made federal procedural
law conflict. See, e.g., Slaven v. BP Am., Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1472, 1478 (C.D. Cal. 1997)
(declining to apply ordinarily applicable California settlement statute in case involving both federal maritime and state claims because of effect on uniform application
of federal maritime law and stating that "even when a state substantive law is generally
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sor David Currie has described them, the relevant interests are those
of a "forum disinterested in the merits... in the application of rules
relating to the administration of justice.' u8 4 Aside from recognizing
such limits on what might constitute a relevant type of federal interest,
at the moment all that we may be able to do with any confidence is to
identify the terms of the argument and some possible specific areas in
addition to that recognized in Byrd and Gasperini,and to give reasons
for favoring broader or narrower approaches to what might be worthy
of treatment as an "essential characteristic" or "countervailing federal
interest" triggering Byrd-Gasperinibalancing or accommodation.
Gasperini'sreliance on Byrd could force more threshold consideration in lower federal courts ofjust what is an "essential characteristic"
or whether a "countervailing federal interest" is present in cases involving conflict between state law with a substantive cast and decisional federal procedural law. So far, though, only a handful of postGasperinicases include substantial dealing with Byrd, and they sometimes appropriately find no "essential characteristic" involved or cast
doubt on whether the inquiry is suitable in the situation before the
court. 8 5 And in what may be a demonstration of the vagaries of balto be applied in a federal court, it nevertheless cannot be applied in those limited
situations where 'there is a significant conflict between some federal policy or interest
and the use of state law'" (quoting O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 87
(1994)). Although exploration of parallels and differences among these areas could
well prove informative, see Stephen B. Burbank, InterjurisdictionalPreclusion, Full Faith
and Credit and Federal Common Law: A GeneralApproach, 71 CoRINLL L. REv. 733, 737
(1986), life and the patience of the reader are likely to be too short to warrant going
further in this direction here.
184 DAVID P. CumuE, FEDERAL JURIsDICTION IN A NUTSHELL 221 (3d ed. 1990); see
also REDISH, supra note 96, at 238:
Certainly there is some legitimate interest in allowing a court to decide
for itself how most fairly to conduct its procedures. A court's integrity is to a
degree dependent upon its authority to control matters that are intimately
bound up with its dally internal operations. In this sense, a court's power to
determine the fairest procedures could be viewed as qualitatively different
from its authority to develop principles of substantive law.
185 Two such cases deal with state laws requiring a "certificate of review" or "affidavit of merit" to bring an action alleging professional misconduct, and both hold the
state provisions applicable. See Trierweiler v. Croxton & Trench Holding Corp., 90
F.3d 1523, 1540 (10th Cir. 1996) ("In this case, the imposition on the federal courtone additional filing with the court-is relatively minor. This is not a case where
'essential characteristic[s]' of the federal system would be altered if the state rule were
applied."); RTC Mortgage Trust 1994 N-1 v. Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 981 F. Supp.
334, 347 (D.NJ. 1997) ("[A]n 'essential characteristic' inquiry would seem at least
somewhat redundant where that characteristic is already fully embodied in a federal
statute or rule. Nonetheless, because the Court can conceive of no aspect of federal
practice or procedure which might be altered by application of the Affidavit of Merit
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ancing, the only post-Gasperini case I have found that identifies a
"strong federal policy" behind ajudge-made procedural rule-that on
class-action tolling, from two Supreme Court decisions 186-nonetheless holds a contrary state tolling rule to be an "integral part" of a state
statute of limitations and therefore applicable.1 8 7 From other decisions or commentary, a non-exhaustive list of specific areas that might
involve "essential characteristics" and "countervailing federal interests" would include forum non conveniens law18 8 and possibly in-

terjurisdictional preclusion when not governed by the federal fullfaith-and-credit statute.1 89
To try to do more than just pointing out examples, and to address instead the terms in which argument over the identification of
"essential characteristics" and "countervailing federal interests" might
most informatively be conducted: your leanings are likely to be affected strongly by your attitude toward balancing approaches.
Whatever the problems of the "twin aims" test, those of balancing can
be severe:
[T] here is no scale on which the balancing process called for by the

[Byrd] Court can take place. There is no way to say with assurance
in a particular case that the federal interest asserted is more or less

important than the value of preserving uniformity of result with the
state court. Even if there were such a scale, the weights to be placed
upon it must be whatever the judges say they are.190
statute, because the issue is not covered by a federal rule, and because the state statute
is outcome determinative, the state statute will apply.") (footnote omitted).
186 See Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345 (1983); American Pipe &
Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974).
187 SeeVaughtv. Showa Denko K.K., 107 F.3d 1137, 1147 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 118

S. Ct. 67 (1997).
188 See In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, Louisiana on July 9, 1982, 821
F.2d 1147, 1159 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc) ("[T]he interests of the federal forum in
self-regulation, in administrative independence, and in self-management are more
important than the disruption of uniformity created by applying federal forum non
conveniens in diversity cases."), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Lopez, 490 U.S. 1032 (1989).
189 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994). See generally Burbank, supra note 183, at 787-97. Acknowledging that much authority favors judge-made federal preclusion law, Burbank
expresses skepticism about treating the area of preclusion rules for federal diversity
judgments in Byrd's terms and concludes, "Until such time as federal policy relevant to
preclusion law is more clearly articulated, through processes providing safeguards
against judicial parochialism, state law should provide the norm on most questions."
Id. at 797.
190 19 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 93, § 4508, at 242. Compare, e.g., In re Air Crash
Disaster,821 F.2d at 1159 ("[Tlhe integrity of our fact-finding processes must outweigh considerations of uniformity."), with id. at 1180-81 (Higginbotham, J., concur-
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Such problems of comparative weighing are compounded by the initial difficulty of deciding whether a federal interest sufficient to trigger the Byrd-Gasperinianalysis, beyond the interests already identified
by the Court in the area of judge-jury and trial-appeal allocation of
decisionmaking responsibility, exists in the first place. There is the
further danger that federal courts "free to conjure up 'interests'"
might fall prey to the "natural tendency of institutions to seize the
moment to expand their power." 19'
Even Professor Redish, probably the leading academic proponent
of balancing, identified only one major federal interest that he would
regard as sufficient "to outbalance a truly significant competing state
interest-that of avoiding significant cost or inconvenience to the federal courts that would accompany the application of a particular state
procedural rule"' 9 2-and admitted that the courts had mostly not
adopted that view. 193 The considerations counseling strong hesitancy
to find federal "interests" that suffice to trigger interest analysis also
find some support both in the Court's limit so far to areas under
strong Seventh Amendment influence and in the language used in
Byrd and Gasperini. Not just any federal interest should qualify, for
presumably federal decisional rules are chosen because the federal
courts regard them as better than the alternatives; yet finding a "countervailing federal interest" in the sheer rationale behind any judgemade federal procedural rule-which the Court has not done-would
prove too much, for it would replace the "twin aims" analysis with balancing or accomodation in all cases. Further, the Court has referred
not to "distinguishing" or "significant" characteristics of the federal
judicial system, but to "essential" ones. The implicit requirement
seems appropriately demanding. 9 4 Of sufficiently weighty federal
"interests," beyond those established by the Constitution, acts of Congress, Federal Rules, and the Court's decisions already on the books,
there should be few, if any.
ring in judgment) ("Of course, federal courts have an interest in self-administration;
they do in every Erie decision. But that interest must be viewed with caution when it
lacks the support of the Rules Enabling Act mandate or an independent constitutional interest such as the seventh amendment .... ").
191 Burbank, supra note 183, at 789-90.

192 REDISH, supra note 96, at 239 (footnote omitted).
193 Id.
194

See King, supra note 12, at 184 (the author argued that the GasperiniCourt, by

not mentioning federal interests in the choice of verdict-excessiveness standard to be
applied at trial-court level, may have "implicitly recognized that there were no federal
interests worth balancing. This reading of Gasperinilimits the Byrd case so that federal
interests requiring consideration arise only rarely.").
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Even in several areas that deal with judgejury relations or verdict
review other than verdict excessiveness or insufficiency, Gasperinimay
not change analyses or results. Different approaches or outcomes
should follow now, if I have read Gasperini right, only when judgemade federal decisional law could apply rather than the Constitution,
a federal statute, or a Federal Rule, and an "essential characteristic" of
the federal judicial system affecting a "countervailing federal interest"
that may be sufficiently weighty to offset a conflicting state interest
with substantive overtones is involved. If any of these factors is not
present, other tests such as "arguably procedural" for a federal statute,
the REA analysis for a Federal Rule, or the Hanna dictum's "twin
aims" spin on "outcome determination" for most decisional-federallaw situations should apply now as before. That can leave such matters as summary judgment standards governed by Federal Rule 56,195
appellate review ofjudge-tried fact questions governed by Rule 52 (a) 's
"clearly erroneous" standard, 196 and rulings on motions for judgment
as a matter of law governed by Rule 50 as amended in 1991.197 And if

state-vs.-federal law issues arise about standards for new-trial motions
195 See, e.g., Mayer v. Gary Partners & Co., 29 F.3d 330, 334 (7th Cir. 1994).
196 See, e.g., id.
197 See 17 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACrICE, supra note 57, § 124.0717] [c], at 124-59
(describing Federal Rule 50 as having been amended in 1991 "expressly to incorporate a standard of review into the rule") (footnote omitted); Childress, supra note 156,
at 312; King, supra note 12, at 176 ("The 1991 amendments to the Federal Rules have
apparently resolved this choice-of-law question in favor of a 'reasonable jury' stan-

dard. Federal Rule 50(a) allows a federal court to direct a verdict against a party
when 'there is no sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for the
party' on an issue essential to the party's defense or claim.") (footnotes omitted).
If Rule 50 is not read as supplying a standard, then room for argument could
remain on the much-controverted issue of whether the federal or state standard for
sufficiency of the evidence to go to the jury should prevail on state-law matters in
federal court when the two differ. See generally Mayer, 29 F.3d at 335 (abandoning
previous circuit rule favoring state standard for sufficiency of evidence on motions
during and after trial, on grounds that rule goes to whether judge or jury should
evaluate sufficiency and that Supreme Court had mandated parallel standards for
summary judgment, provided by Federal Rule 56, and judgment as matter of law during or after trial under Federal Rule 50); Childress, supranote 156, at 290-316 (surveying differences among circuits and arguing that basic Erieprinciples point toward
federal standard).
The Cornell Note argues that Gasperinicould be read as having undermined the
view that the 1991 amendment to Rule 50 provides a governing standard: "[B]ecause
Gasperini allowed state law to flesh out the meaning of Rule 59, a similar argument
could be made that state law should qualify the 'reasonable jury' standard embodied
in Rule 50(a)." King, supra note 12, at 191. The apparent clarity of the 1991 amendment's language and intent, plus the Rule 50-Rule 56 parallel pointed out by the
Mayer court, supra, make it seem doubtful that the hitherto dominant reading of
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(on grounds other than verdict excessiveness or inadequacy) in statelaw cases under Federal Rule 59(a), 198 beyond state law's providing
the guidance for what the court should assure that the jury was to
consider in determining liability and damage amounts, strong precedent and the lack of a substantive state interest may dictate federal-law
guidance for federal courts' decisions on whether to grant or deny a
new trial.' 9 9 My review of post-Gasperini cases in the lower federal
20 0
courts does not indicate that they are doing otherwise.
amended Rule 50 is seriously vulnerable to such undermining. See also supra note 126
(discussing reasons for not expecting questionably broad readings of Gasperini).
198 FED. R Crv. P. 59(a):
A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part'
of the issues (1) in an action in which there has been a trial by jury, for any
of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions
at law in the courts of the United States ....
See Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2224 n.22 (rejecting argument that Rule 59(a) itself, at least
in the verdict-excessiveness context that was before the Court, provides "a 'federal
standard' for new trial motions").
199 See Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 278-79 (1989)
(footnote and citations omitted):
Review of the district court's order [refusing to grant a Rule 59 new-trial
motion] involves questions of both state and federal law. In a diversity action, or in any other lawsuit where state law provides the basis of decision,
the propriety of an award of punitive damages for the conduct in question,
and the factors the jury may consider in determining their amount, are questions of state law. Federal law, however, will control on those issues involving
the proper review of the jury award by a federal district court and court of
appeals.
See also Mayer, 29 F.3d at 334 ("When acting on motions for new trials in diversity
cases, district judges use the same approach they apply in cases arising under federal
law. States may prohibit discretionary awards of new trials or use their own standards,
without effect on the conduct of federal litigation."); Childress, supra note 156, at 288
("Courts of appeals should generally look to the federal standard of review on all new
trial motions.") (citations omitted).
The Cornell Note reads Gasperini, because the Court chose state law on verdict
excessiveness to govern when a federal trial judge must rule on a new-trial motion
seeking remittitur, as meaning that this "majority rule" in the courts of appeals-that
"federal standards govern a trial judge's ruling on a motion for new trial"-even
though apparently adopted by the Supreme Court in Browning-Ferris"no longer stands
firm." King, supra note 12, at 189, 190 (footnote omitted). This reading seems questionably to deny the possibility that verdict-excessiveness standards, which can readily
have substantive overtones and which Gasperiniconsiders largely on their own, can be
treated distinctly from other issues concerning the source of law for new-trial standards. See supranote 156. The Note's view is also hard to square with Gasperiniitself,
which quotes Browning-Ferrisfavorablyboth as to matters that case held to be governed
by federal law and issues on which Browning-Ferrissaid that state law governs. See Gas-

perini, 116 S. Ct. at 2224 & n.22.
200

See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
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F. Summay and Update
Gasperini does suggest some changes in what the Supreme Court
is saying about approaches to Erie-Hannaissues, but the basic framework for analysis that has prevailed since Hanna appears very much
intact. The two differences of particular note seem to be a degree of
emphasis on construing possibly applicable Federal Rules with sensitivity to important state interests to avoid "direct conflicts" with state
law when possible, and more centrally the clear preservation of Byrd
interest analysis in a subset of cases involving judge-made federal procedural rules. As best we may be able to tell on the basis of Gasperini
itself and subsequent lower-court decisions, the Hanna"twin aims" approach remains applicable to such decisional-rule cases-unless an "essential characteristic" of the federal judicial system presenting a
"countervailing federal interest" is involved. In such cases Byrd and
Gasperinicall for a broadening beyond the "twin aims" version of "outcome-determination" analysis to include consideration of the nature
and weight of the state's interest in application of its own rule in federal court, with particular focus on whether it is "bound up with"
clearly substantive state-law rights and an eye to whether the state or
federal interest should prevail or if the two can be accommodated. It
is too early to hazard more than a fairly tentative guess, but the size of
the subset in which such federal interests-which can only be procedural, and in cases not governed by positive federal law-should be
found may extend little or not at all beyond the Seventh Amendmentinfluenced area of allocation of functions among federal juries, trial
judges, and appellate courts.
IV.

CONCLUSION

This essay has not pushed back the frontiers of Erie scholarship by
offering a new theory of how to approach state-federal law-choice issues. The essential outlines of what I have presented were developed
in Hanna and elucidated almost a quarter of a century ago by Professor Ely.20 1 In many respects, this very lack of novelty reflects a central
point: while we academics cannot begrudge our colleagues and students their efforts to suggest better ways than those the Supreme
Court has developed, the framework the Court has provided-in addition to being reasonably sensitive to federalist concerns and the nu201 He appears to have been speaking with some authority. His introductory footnote cautions, "In order to enable the reader to discount for possible bias, he is
warned that the author was ChiefJustice Warren's law clerk during the Term in which
Hanna v. Plumer was decided." Ely, supra note 29, at 693 n.*. Chief Justice Warren
delivered the majority opinion in Hanna.
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ances of a somewhat complex area, and fairly comprehensible and
workable in its broad outlines-has been remarkably stable through
over three decades of case-law developments and persistent academic
critique. The Court has even managed to produce an opinion for a
clear majority in every one of its leading Erie-Hannadecisions, avoiding the fragmentation that plagues many other areas.
Collegiality makes me a bit hesitant to say so, but on the whole in
this field it seems to me that the Court deserves higher marks than
most of the academic commentators. 20 2 To be sure, the Court's work
since Hanna has been far from flawless. Its apparent straining with
applications of its framework in some cases20 3 gives reason to wonder
if it has decreed a degree of formalism with which it is reluctant itself
to live. (Manipulability in borderline cases, though, is nothing new to
the law; and those troubled by indefiniteness under the Court's current Erie-Hanna approaches should try general balancing instead.)
Moreover, the Court's failure, with the notable exception of the
Hanna dictum's "twin aims" recasting of York's "outcome-determination" test, to be explicit about what in its prior decisions it is modifying or abandoning creates openings for uncertainty-witness some of
my disagreements with other commentators-and for inconsistent applications in the lower federal courts. And the cryptic nature of key
aspects of the Gasperini majority opinion leaves room for puzzled
dissatisfaction.
Yet there is also room for puzzlement at what has sometimes been
the obfuscatory performance of academic critics of the Court's ErieHanna line of decisions.2 0 4 One explanation may be that this area
combines inherent complexity and interest while being a key part of
the rite of passage through which most of us went and continue to put
our students; it may have such a hold on us that we can't leave well
enough alone. The academic incentive structure may also conduce to
hypercriticality; it probably helps to have had tenure for a good many
years before setting out to say that the Court has done a halfway decent job and that its doctrines don't need a major overhaul. Still, to
find grounds for understanding the academy's performance here
202 Given the length of this essay, it also earns higher marks at least for conciseness
than this commentator.
203 See, e.g., Stewart Org., 487 U.S. at 34-38 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing
breadth of majority's statutory construction).
204 Cf Ely, supranote 29, at 697-98 ("[T]he indiscriminate admixture of all questions respecting choices between federal and state law in diversity cases, under the
single rubric of 'the Erie doctrine' or 'the Erie problem,' has served to make a major
mystery out of what are really three distinct and rather ordinary problems of statutory
and constitutional interpretation.").
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should not excuse any failures to read carefully what the Court has
been saying, and to presentit fairly and lucidly before we criticize and
theorize. Doing so is part of our professional obligation, and above all
we should try to stop misleading the courts and confusing our
students.

